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AMERICAN VIEWS OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN NATO ENLARGEMENT

by

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December 1996

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
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on official and unofficial American views of Russian national interests as revealed in the discussion about NATO enlargement. The thesis begins with a theoretical investigation of the concept of the national interest based on the approach of the realist school. Specifically, two positions are considered: namely, the power position and the security position. The thesis applies this theory to the discussion of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement. It reveals a host of attitudes behind official US policy some of them contradictory. These tell us interesting things about American attitudes toward Russia and about the motives behind US support for NATO enlargement. The thesis fosters a better understanding of the rationale behind US foreign policy toward Russia in general and regarding NATO enlargement in particular.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS	3
A. REALISTS' APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST	5
1. General Description of the Realists' Theory	5
B. THE POWER APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST	8
1. The Definition of Power.....	8
C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE POWER APPROACH IN ASSESSING NATIONAL INTEREST.....	9
D. THE SECURITY APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST	11
E. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY APPROACH IN ASSESSING NATIONAL INTEREST.....	12
F. THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST.....	14
G. DETERMINANTS OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST.....	15
1. Objective Determinants.....	15
2. The Subjective Aspect of the National Interest	16
H. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST	18
1. Images.....	18
2. Motivations.....	19
3. Values	21
I. THE SYSTEM DIMENSION.....	22
J. CLASSIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST.....	25

1. Frankel's Approach	25
2. Nuechterlein's Approach.....	28
3. The National Interest Matrix.....	32
III. AMERICAN VIEWS OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN NATO	
ENLARGEMENT	35
A GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES IN EUROPE.....	35
B. THE NEW NATO.....	38
C. THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND NATO	
ENLARGEMENT	40
D. THE AREA OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS	43
E. THE POSITION OF FIRM MAXIMALISTS	44
1. Theoretical Foundation	44
F. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT.....	49
G. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS	50
H. ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA	
THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS	54
I. THE POSITION OF FLEXIBLE MAXIMALISTS	56
J. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE POSITION.....	56
K. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT	57
L. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS.....	59
M. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA	
THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS	60
N. THE POSITION OF MINIMALISTS	61

O. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION	61
P. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT	64
Q. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS	65
R. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS	69
S. THE US OFFICIAL POSITION	70
T. ATTITUDE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT	70
U. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION	70
V. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT	76
W. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS	78
X. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS	80
IV. SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY	83
A. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS	97
1. Question One	97
2. Question Two	97
3. Question Three	97
4. Question Four	98
5. Question Five	98
6. Question Six	98
7. Question Seven	98
8. Question Eight	99
9. Question Nine	99
10. Question Ten	99

11. Question Eleven	100
12. Question Twelve.....	100
B. RESPONDENTS' COMMENTARY	100
1. Statement Nine	100
2. Statement Ten.....	101
3. Statement Eleven.....	102
4. Statement Twelve.....	103
V. CONCLUSIONS.....	105
BIBLIOGRAPHY	109
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	113

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Relationship Between Foreign and National Security Policy	14
2. Formation of the National Interest in a Two-state System.....	17
3. Objects of Action on X.....	23
4. Dynamic Stability.....	24
5. Time Dimension and Categories of Interests.....	30
6. Question 1	84
7. Question 2.....	85
8. Question 3	86
9. Question 4.....	87
10. Question 5.....	88
11. Question 6.....	89
12. Question 7.....	90
13. Question 8.....	91
14. Question 9.....	92
15. Question 10.....	93
16. Question 11.....	94
17. Question 12.....	95
18. Question 13.....	96

LIST OF TABLES

1. Maximalists Path to NATO Enlargement.....	49
2. Flexible Maximalists Path to NATO Enlargement	57
3. Connection Maximalists Path to NATO Enlargement.....	64
4. US Path to NATO Enlargement.....	76

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The thesis focuses on official and unofficial American views of Russian national interests as revealed in the discussion about NATO enlargement. It begins with a theoretical investigation of the concept of the national interest based on the approach of the realist school. Specifically, two positions are considered: namely, the power position and the security position. The thesis applies this theory to the discussion of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement. It reveals a host of attitudes behind official US policy some of them contradictory. These tell us interesting things about American attitudes toward Russia and about the motives behind US support for NATO enlargement.

The theoretical examination of the concept of the national interest and its practical application in the investigation of American views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement establish the foundation for a sociological survey aimed at assessing the perceptions of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement among American military officers at the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School.

Chapter I, the introduction, briefly describes current geopolitical realities in Europe and introduces central issues of the thesis.

Chapter II discusses the notion of the national interest from the viewpoint of political science theory. It analyzes the notion of the national interest on the basis of two approaches of the realist school--namely, the power and security positions--and gives them a critical assessment. Then the national interest is classified and is studied on the basis of a matrix.

Chapter III creates and examines theoretical constructs of American unofficial views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement, and on this basis, tests two hypotheses connected with the official US position.

Chapter IV considers the results of the sociological survey.

Chapter V evaluates the validity and utility of the notion of the national interest based on the classification and the matrix of the national interest. It also focuses on the relation of the official US position to unofficial ones.

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I. INTRODUCTION

According to the most recent official statement of US national security policy, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," with the end of the Cold War, "The primary security imperative of the past half century--containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war--was gone. Instead, we confronted a complex array of new and old security challenges..."¹ The disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union have led to a new geopolitical situation. The rigid bilateral European system and the presence of nuclear weapons had provided a more or less stable peace in Europe. With the end of that system, NATO has to decide what mission or missions it will have in the new environment. The decision has been made to modernize the alliance in order to meet new security requirements.

So what is the new NATO? In order to answer this question it is necessary to look at the initial purpose behind NATO's creation in 1949. According to the first secretary-general of the alliance, Lord Ismay, the idea of NATO was to "Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."² Beginning with NSC-68 (1950), NATO's primary purpose was the containment of the Soviet Union, a policy that continued until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The end of the Cold War, according to Senator Joseph Biden, led NATO to "a crisis of identity."³ The question, "What is NATO for?" is closely connected to the questions "What is NATO enlargement for?" With respect to my thesis, this crisis of identity raises the question, "What are the Russian national interests in NATO enlargement as seen from the American perspective?" The purpose of this thesis is to explore this question.

¹ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House. 1996. p. 1.

² Josef Joffe, "Is There Life After Victory?" *The National Interest*, Fall 1995, p. 25.

³ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*. U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 1994. p. 2.

The general goal of the thesis is a better understanding of the rationale behind US foreign policy toward Russia in general and regarding NATO enlargement in particular.

Chapter II discusses two realist-school approaches to the notion of the national interest: namely, the power position and the security position. The aim is to assess these approaches in terms of their practical utility in today's international politics. This chapter also focuses on the formation of the national interest and proposes classification based on those put forward by Frankel and Nuechterlein.

Chapter III examines theoretical constructs of unofficial American views concerning Russian national interests in NATO enlargement. These constructs include two different rationales for why NATO enlargement should be pursued and what impact NATO enlargement has on Russian national interests, and a third one which argues that NATO enlargement should not occur.

Chapter IV discusses a sociological survey created conducted specifically for this thesis at the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. The aim of the survey is to understand American military officers' views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement. The results of the survey will be considered in terms of their relation to any of the above-mentioned theoretical constructs and the US official position.

Chapter V investigates the validity of the theoretical approach to the notion of the national interest and evaluates tested hypotheses.

II. THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The prime purpose of this section is not to persuade or dissuade the reader of the existence of the notion of the national interest. The purpose is to look at this notion as a conceptual approach aimed at better understanding state behavior in international relations and international relations in general.

The national interest is often considered to be obscure, subjective and hard to define. Another difficulty is the existence of different approaches to the definition of the national interest.

The beginning of the application of the notion of national interest can be dated back to the time of Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. According to the treaty all states were considered to be subjects of international relations. The foundation of relations was the compatibility or balance of national interests.

At the theoretical level different schools of political science have treated the notion of national interest differently. For example, Marxists rejected it. In fact the theoreticians of Marxism did not examine directly the notion of the national interest. Lenin connected the issue of national interest with a subjective class approach rather than taking into account objective geopolitical variables. However, in the 19th century Engels noted, "The ruling class only because it is ruling bears responsibility for the position of the whole nation and is obliged to take care of common interests."⁴ Thus, even proponents of a class approach in political science admitted the existence of objective interests.

Another difficulty is connected with the assumption that in multinational states various nations' interests may not coincide, and even may contradict each other. In principle, this may be true, but that does not exclude the fact that, normally, all nations within the same state face the same challenges in their external environment. Further in this thesis the notion of the national interest will comprise the interest of a nation in a

⁴ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Polnoye sobranie sochineniy*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1955.), p. 355.

homogeneous state or common interests of various nations in a multinational state. Here national interest equals state interest. The national interest in international politics is defined as the realized needs and aspirations of a nation in relation to challenges the nation faces in its external environment.⁵

One more methodological problem may arise when the national interest is examined from two other approaches, namely, the national interest as political analysis and as political action. The methodological difference between the two interests is the following:

As an analytical tool, it [i.e., the concept of the national interest] is employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies. Both usages, in other words, refer to what is best for a national society. They also share a tendency to confine the intended meaning to what is best for a national society. Beyond these general considerations, however, the two uses of the concept have little in common.⁶

However, as Joseph Frankel noted,

This analytical distinction appeals to common sense, but does not offer the means for further logical analysis or for empirical investigation. Within each argument, by whomever it is made, there is no clear-cut distinction between these two uses of the concept. When we discuss whether it is in the national interest of a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to maintain the organization, this involves both the discussion of NATO as an instrument of national strategy and a prescription, be it to maintain or to reduce defenses against Soviet communism.⁷

Bearing this distinction in mind, it is useful to stress that both political analysis and political action are two sides of the same coin. They are both parts of political decision-making. At the first stage both political science scholars and politicians are involved in the political analysis of the national interest, while at the second stage politicians make

⁵ This definition is adapted from Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s* (The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p. 7.

⁶ *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* (1968, p. 34), cited in Joseph Frankel, *National Interest* (London, Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.16.

decisions based on this analysis and aimed at achieving the national interest. Further in this study this distinction will be made where it is necessary.

A. REALISTS' APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The scholars belonging to the realist school, like Hans Morgenthau, Nicholas Spykman and Kenneth Waltz, have made the major contribution to the theory of the national interest. So it is advisable to examine their approach to the issue.

1. General Description of the Realists' Theory

For better understanding it is necessary to focus on the following peculiarities of their theory:

a. *Anarchy in International Relations*

Following the Hobbesian description of the international system as one of anarchy, realists stress the absence of a higher formal authority or world government. Good will is not the instrument which can regulate international relations. As Kenneth Waltz noted, "Among states as among men there is no automatic adjustment of the interests. In the absence of supreme authority, there is then, constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force."⁸

b. *A Self-Help System in International Relations*

According to another fundamental assumption of the realists a state can preserve its independence only by being self-reliant. "Each actor is ultimately responsible for its own survival. Pledges, promises, and good will notwithstanding, no actor can surrender its fate to another and remain even a theoretical equal."⁹

⁷ Joseph, Frankel, *National Interest* (London, Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.16.

⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York, 1959), p. 188.

⁹ Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Abdul A. Said, *Concepts of International Politics*, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp.109-110.

c. *A Nation-state in International Relations*

A nation-state is not free in its behavior. It is an actor which has to play by objective laws. These laws are possible to study. As Hans Morgenthau emphasized,

There is a rational element in political action that makes politics susceptible to theoretical analysis, but there is also a contingent element in politics that obviates the possibility of theoretical understanding. The material with which the theoretician of politics must deal is ambiguous. The events he must try to understand are, on the one hand, unique occurrences: They happened in this way only once and never before or since. On the other hand, they are similar; for they are manifestations of social forces. Social forces are the product of human nature in action. Therefore, under similar circumstances, they will manifest themselves in a similar manner.¹⁰

But a similar manner does not mean the same manner. The task of a policy-maker is to make a two-level comparative analysis. The first one is diachronic from present to past and is based on the analysis of the cases belonging to past experience. The second one is synchronic and is based on the analysis of the present cases. Such comparative analysis makes it possible to work out A, B, C patterns of policy-making. Comparative analysis makes it possible to identify a new occurrence as unique in its properties but close to, for example, pattern C and far from pattern A and B. In this particular case, it will be a C1 pattern, combining properties of the C pattern and ones unique to this case.

Political scientist Arnold Wolfers argues,

Some degree of uniformity of behavior among actors belonging to any specific category is so persistently present that even the historian takes account of it at least by implication. It would make no sense for him to use terms like great power, landlocked country, or have-not nation in dealing with historical actors if it were not proper to assume that those who belong to one of these generic groups share one or more common traits of behavior...¹¹

¹⁰ Hans Morgenthau, *Truth and Power* (New York, 1970), p. 254.

¹¹ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, 1962), p. 45.

As a matter of fact, analyzing the Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 20th century we can draw a certain analogy with the present time. In the period between 1905-1914 to some extent Russia faced the same general tasks and had the same interests in its foreign policy as it is facing today. First, being a great power, the country is searching for its place in evolving multipolar world. Second, its foreign policy is aimed at ensuring a favorable international environment. At the beginning of the century, estimating the policy of state and economic development, Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky noted, "After recent external and internal shake-ups Russia needs period of concentration of power and peaceful state-building."¹² The task of diplomacy was to ensure the most favorable international conditions for this state-building.

Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the strength of rationality in policy-making, since it is difficult to perceive and predict human nature and contingencies. But it is possible to state, with Morgenthau that "the element of rationality, order, and regularity lies in the limited number of possible choices within each system of multiple choice. Viewed with the guidance of a rationalistic, blueprinted map, the social world is, indeed, a chaos of contingencies. Yet it is not devoid of a measure of rationality if approached with the modest expectations of a circumspect theory."¹³

d. A Nation-state has a Set of Well-defined Interests.

Being a rational actor in the ocean of international relations, a state makes rational choices in defining and achieving national interests. Any state chooses a policy in terms of costs and benefits with a view to maximizing its interests. The primary national interest of a state is self-preservation or survival, while all other interests are subordinate to this one.

¹² Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Sozyv 3. Sessiya 2. Stenographicheskiye Otschety (Saint-Peterburg, 1908), p. 2620.

¹³ Hans Morgenthau, *Truth and Power* (New York, 1970), p. 5.

B. THE POWER APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The foundation for the power approach to the study of the national interest was laid down by such classical realpolitik theorists as Hans Morgenthau and Nicholas Spykman. Morgenthau sees this approach as “the concept of interest defined in terms of power.”¹⁴ In his opinion, “A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.”¹⁵

1. The Definition of Power

According to Spykman “power means survival, the ability to impose one’s will on others, the capacity to dictate to those who are without power, and the possibility of forcing concessions from those with less power.”¹⁶ One’s power “depends not only on military forces but on many other factors—size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technological development, financial strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social integration, political stability, and national spirit.”¹⁷ Some components of power can be quantitative, while others are hard to quantify. It is possible to look at the theoretical background of power in Morgenthau’s terms: “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics.”¹⁸ In this way, power can rationalize an area so subjective as politics. But the power of a nation has a relative character. It depends not only on the power components of the nation itself but on the power of other nations.

The desire to obtain and increase power leads to a balance-of-power policy whose “purpose is to influence directly the power position of other states, to weaken some, to

¹⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power* (New York, 1973), p. 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁶ Nicholas Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York, 1942), p. 18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁸ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power*, p. 5.

strengthen others.”¹⁹ For realists, power is the most reliable and credible prerequisite of a state’s well-being. “Experience has shown that there is more safety in balanced power than in a declaration of good intentions.”²⁰ However, the balance in itself is meaningless and insufficient if it does not meet another requirement. As Spykman stressed, “The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger.”²¹ Thus, according to Spykman, the power of the state lays down the foundation of the policy of the state and it can only be limited by the power of its opponent.

Thus, to a great extent for Morgenthau and Spykman power is an instrument and an end in itself in foreign policy “because in the last instance only power can achieve the objectives of foreign policy.”²² The implication here is that to maximize power means to achieve the national interest.

C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE POWER APPROACH IN ASSESSING NATIONAL INTEREST

Arnold Wolfers compares the role of power in international relations to the role of money in a market economy. He divides people into three groups: a) people who need money to meet their basic requirements in life; b) people who accumulate money as reserve and to obtain freedom of action; and c) people who value money as an end in itself. In Wolfers’ opinion states are like people. For the first group of states, power is necessary as a tool to achieve set goals or national interests. This is the most numerous group. For the second group, power is necessary as a reserve to achieve future goals or to defend national interests when they are not challenged yet. For the third group, power is necessary as an end

¹⁹ Spykman, p. 19.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

²¹ Ibid., p. 21.

²² Ibid., p. 18.

in itself. Power for them is an inexplicable race for the sake of power. Morgenthau's passion for power coincides with the drive of the third group of states.

Nowadays power cannot be an end in itself in its classical realist meaning for several reasons. First, objectively, due to the growing world interdependence, "in the emerging structure, national power is much more diffused, making the exertion of influence by any nation over any other nation much more difficult."²³ Nevertheless, it is necessary to stress that "adequacy is a matter of subjective estimates, the factors which influence these estimates are of major interest. Two countries having the same goals and acting under similar circumstances may differ widely in their views on adequacy of power."²⁴

Second, the present state of global development has a controversial character. Despite deepening interdependency, "major change in the external security environment is found in the evolving structure of the post-cold war international political system. It is not only much more fragmented, but at the same time more independent."²⁵

The end of Cold War speeded up the alterations in the priority of power components. The importance of military power is giving way to economic and technological sources of national power. For example, the United States has adopted the concept of "forward presence."

Forward presence recognizes the strategic implications of global integration and interdependence—the relevant choice for great powers now and in the future is either to influence global events or to be influenced by them. Forward presence also recognizes the increased importance of nonmilitary instruments of power relative to the military. The new role of forward presence forces, properly understood, is not to defend US interests

²³ Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, *American National Security. Policy and Process* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 531.

²⁴ Wolfers, p. 94.

²⁵ Jordan, et al., p. 531.

directly but to provide leverage for diplomatic and economic instruments of policy.²⁶

However, military power is still regarded as indispensable to achieve national interests when peaceful means fail. So far it is far too early to write off the significance of the military in the assessment of power.

Going back to Spykman's definition of power cited above, it is necessary to admit that in the present world it may sound too extreme. Today another definition of power might be more acceptable: "The general capability of a state to influence the behavior of others."²⁷ But it would be appropriate to view power not only as capability to influence the behavior of another state but also the capability to resist another's influence. Power is the means to achieve national interests with the priority given to the peaceful components of power.

D. THE SECURITY APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST

In theoretical terms, realists examine the notion of security from two perspectives. Namely, objective and subjective. In the first perspective, "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values."²⁸ At the unit level of analysis, balance among a nation's/or a state's power components can be undermined by changes among them. For example, the increase of a state's military power at the expense of other components of national power may surpass the level of sufficiency necessary to defend the country. At the structural level of analysis such change in configuration of the sources of a nation's side power will lead to a shift in interstate relations, namely, to changes in the balance of power. This in its turn creates the basis to measure the threat to the "acquired values" of a state. At the subjective level security is "the absence of fear that such values

²⁶ Don M. Snider, p. 46.

²⁷ Jordan, et al., p. 25.

²⁸ Wolfers, p. 150.

will be attacked.”²⁹ However, from the subjective level of the security approach it is not enough to change the balance of power. Fear of the nation’s values being attacked materializes when there is a credible sign of hostility.

According to realist theory, “basic to all kinds of national self-interest is survival or self-preservation, for upon national survival depends the achievement of all other self-interested ends.”³⁰ From this point of view, security is the condition or a tool to achieve survival. But there is another approach to security where it is a primary goal rather than simply a tool. Under “a high-threat system, the hierarchy of state interests is dominated by security. Although security interests and other interests reinforce each other over the long term, in the short term they occasionally come into conflict and, when that happens security interests are given priority. The primary means to security is power.”³¹ The essence of the national interest is to maximize security.

E. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY APPROACH IN ASSESSING NATIONAL INTEREST

From this approach it is possible to consider security as the foundation of the national interest and power as the intermediate stage towards achieving security or as an instrument to achieve it. However, when one side makes an attempt to attain security only by accumulating power, a feeling of insecurity affects policy-makers of the opposite side. In its turn the second side will have to take reactive measures to ensure its security. In this way, the situation tends to be even less secure in the long run. The term to describe this state of affairs is a “security dilemma.”

Assessing the role of military power in achieving security, i.e., the national interest, the importance of such power is declining today. Though strong armed forces were and are

²⁹ Ibid., p. 150.

³⁰ Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago, 1953), p. 5

³¹ *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, Charles Tilly. eds., vol. 1. (Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 225.

a very important condition to ensuring the national interest, attempts to use military power to strengthen the relations with other countries tend to be less fruitful. Local wars and conflicts indicate how difficult, sometimes impossible it is to transform military power into long-term political influence. Military power cannot play the decisive role it used to play to ensure security in international relations. The use of military power is becoming unacceptable and is rejected by many political institutions. For example, current Russian Military Doctrine states, "The Russian Federation ensures its military security by the aggregation of all available means under the priority of political, diplomatic and other peaceful means."³² This attitude does not exclude military factors from policy-making but recognizes an attempt to form a national security policy on a purely military basis tends to spiral into an insecure environment. As a result such policy "can lead to war in the absence of any genuine conflicts of strategic, economic, or ideological interests between states. Thus, states may prefer peace but rationally choose war."³³

The security dilemmas can put a state on the verge of bankruptcy or even collapse. The fate of the Soviet Union is an example of a country having paid too high a price to reach these goals. Its security policy led to huge waste of material resources, an accumulation of surplus armaments and, as a result, a low living standard for the Soviet people. All these factors were a heavy burden for the state and constituted one of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In today's world, the aims of the national security and foreign policy overlap with the sphere of national interests. The relationship between foreign policy and national security policy can be depicted in the following way.³⁴

³² *Voennaya Mysl* (Moscow, November 1993), p. 5-6.

³³ *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, p. 227.

³⁴ Figure 1 is adapted from Jordan, et al., p. 4.




Figure 1. Relationship Between Foreign and National Security Policy

The overlapping zone is the national interest, at which both national security and foreign policy are aimed. This is the national interest related only to international politics.

F. THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The national interest is formed at two levels: objective and subjective. As Wolfers stressed, "The actors can be pictured in matrix of internal and external forces that affect their behavior through pulls and pressures."³⁵ Political scientists and policy-makers have to take into account geopolitical factors which they cannot or can hardly change but which have an effect on policy. Other factors—historical, socio-economic, political and military—are less objective but they lay down the foundation for definition of the national interest at the subjective level and further for political decision-making.

Wolfers also noted a necessary condition to determine the national interest: "Decisions and actions in the international arena can be understood, predicted, and manipulated only in so far as the factors influencing the decision can be identified and isolated."³⁶ So the task is to identify these factors and to determine their degree of influence.

³⁵ Wolfers., p. 37.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 37.

G. DETERMINANTS OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The national interest has objective and subjective determinants.

1. Objective Determinants

Objective determinants of the national interest can be divided into:

a. *Geopolitics*

According to the classical definition, "geopolitics was regarded as the narrow study of how geography affects foreign policy and military strategy. Most often, geopolitics is latent or even inactive."³⁷

In the 19th century Lord Palmerston argued that Britain did not have either eternal enemies or eternal allies; what it had were eternal interests, which Britain ought to follow. Such an approach was explained by the geographical position of the country. Nevertheless, when geopolitical changes occur they create another environment leading to new political and military concepts aimed at defending national interests. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to such a geopolitical situation that the United States had to articulate the above-mentioned concept of "forward presence" while NATO found itself in a search of a new identity. Today Russia faces the same geostrategic issues which she was solving from the 18th to the beginning of the 20th century. Namely, after the creation of independent states in Ukraine and in the Baltics and the loss of the ports and naval bases there, Russia has to resolve the problem of access to the Black and the Baltic seas. Along with this the long-time issue of the Bosforus straits is once again important. On the whole, although being a successor of the Soviet Union because of its altered geopolitical position, Russia cannot play the role of a superpower it used to play before.

b. *Historical, Socio-economic, Political, and Military Factors.*

These factors must be taken into account. To a great extent politicians are not free in making their decisions. They find themselves hostages of the above-mentioned

³⁷ Richard Kugler with Marianna Kozintseva, *Enlarging NATO: Russia Factor* (RAND, 1996), pp.10--11.

factors and decisions made by their predecessors. At this level the nation's place in the geopolitical system, its potential and capability to influence geopolitical processes, is defined.

In the combination of these two levels, "the psychology of the actors in the international arena, instead of operating in limitless space, is confined in its impact on policy by limitations that external conditions—the distribution of power, geographical location, demography, and economic condition—place on choices open to governments in the conduct of foreign relations."³⁸

2. The Subjective Aspect of the National Interest

The subjective aspect of the national interest is connected with the extent of realization of its objective aspect and is the perceived estimation by a nation, bureaucratic organization, a decision-making group or an individual decision-maker. This estimation finds its expression in the pursued policy.

The subjective aspect is not as rigid as the objective one and is open to compromises and concessions. The leadership of a country can consciously turn to compromise or concessions to achieve definite goals in the field of the national interest leaving intact basic requirements for national security. While assessing the national interest in international politics the art of a political decision-maker is to define what this interest is and to what extent it is flexible.

Assessing the essence of the national interest, it is important to note that, inevitably, it is egoistic, as the interests of a nation are of prime importance. At the beginning of the 20th century, Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky said, "Maybe, I will face more sympathy if I say that in the area of the Middle East we have to be guided by *healthy egoism*..."³⁹ [emphasis added] Similarly, in the debates in the Russian State Duma at that time its member Pavel Milyukov claimed,

³⁸ Wolfers., p. 44.

³⁹ *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Sozyv 3. Sessiya 1. Stenographichesky Otschet* (S-Peterburg. 1908), p. 1786.

It is obvious that we cannot sacrifice our own interests to fulfill moral duties.⁴⁰

But any reasonable politician is forced to take into account the interests of other nations, though without sacrificing the paramount interests of his/her own in order to accommodate those of other nations.

The formation of the national interest of a particular country is based not only on the assessment of its own interest but also on the assessment of the national interests of other countries. This assessment includes the objective aspect (geopolitical approach, power), but also the subjective, i.e. the decision-making process and the pursued policy.

The graphic below depicts the formation of the national interest in a two-state system. **A** and **B** represent the states with their objective and subjective aspects of the national interest. Being under influence of the national interest of the state **A** the subjective aspect of state **B** undergoes some changes. It is necessary to emphasize that this is a two-way process.




Figure 2. Formation of the National Interest in a Two-state System

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 1776.

H. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

In order to examine the national interest it is useful to apply such variables offered by Joseph Frankel as images, motivations and values.

1. Images

For the purpose of the analysis it is advisable to focus on political decision-makers' and scholars' assessments of the national interest as they are supposed to define it. Images are personified reflections of the international environment in the mind. In international relations Frankel highlights uncertainties affecting the formation of the images of the national interest.

1. Vagueness of the aspirations and lack of clear priorities;
2. Incomplete knowledge of the international environment;
3. Uncertainties about the behavior of other states and the evolution of the international system.⁴¹

Both decision-makers and scholars may have different pictures of what national interests are like. Besides the above-mentioned uncertainties, differences in the assessments can be explained by the differences in experience and the availability of adequate information on the subject.

However, people often have to act when there is a deficit of reliable information or they have to work when they have to select a small fraction of available information out of huge quantity of it. Thus, an important condition is a capability to make rational and precise decisions under the conditions of limited or surplus information. This requires exceptional analytical capabilities.

Frankel derived his theory from the Gestal school of psychology. According to this school, a person tends to accept evidence corresponding to his adopted pattern and tends to reject those which run counter to his perception of reality. As history testifies, it can lead to

⁴¹ Frankel, pp. 18-19.

disasters in decision-making. A vivid illustration of this is Stalin's disbelief in the possibility of the Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Thus, one more significant condition is the capability of a person to obtain minimal bias to reality. If there is a critical mass of the opposite evidence one should not remain a slave of one's previous approach. That in its turn requires certain flexibility in the assessment. On the whole, the perception of the image is like the horizon: the closer you move toward it the farther it is. The task is to grasp the least distorted image by objective and subjective variables.

Why do decision-makers make one decision or another? It is puzzling to note that on some occasions politicians behave very differently when they have roughly the same images of their national interests. To solve this puzzle it is necessary to examine motivations.

2. Motivations

Wolfers stressed the importance of understanding motivations:

As soon as one seeks to discover the place of goals in the means-ends chain of relationships, almost inevitably one is led to probe into the dark labyrinth of human motives, those internal springs of conscious and subconscious action which Morgenthau calls 'the most illusive of psychological data.' Yet if one fails to inquire why actors choose their goals, one is forced to operate in an atmosphere of such abstraction that nothing revealed but the barest skeleton of the real world of international politics.⁴²

Policy-makers have their own internal motivations which make their contribution to the formulation of the national interest. Among those there is psychological comfort, desire for power and fame, egoism, and self-realization. Motivations often become some sort of driving force in this formulation.

There is another source of motivation coming from outside. A good example of it is a comparison of policy-makers and academic activity in defining the national interests. Policy-makers have to think about public opinion and the victory at the next elections. Inevitably, it affects their views of what constitutes the national interest. In this context the

⁴² Wolfers, p. 70.

national interest can often be considered as a political action. Morgenthau shared his memories of this:

I remember the statement I once heard a former Secretary of State make to the effect that he had always regarded it as his function to give the President advice on the basis of what he thought the principles of a sound American foreign policy required, leaving it to the President to decide how much of those sound principles could be safely put into practice in view of the state of domestic public opinion and the pressures of domestic politics. Thus, the actual foreign policies pursued by a government staffed even by theoreticians are bound to fall short, from time to time, of the requirements of a pure theoretical understanding of what American foreign policy ought to be. It is here that the theoretician of foreign policy must perform the function of an intellectual conscience which reminds the policy makers as well as the public at large of what the sound principles of foreign policy are and in what respects and to what extent actual policies have fallen short of those principles.⁴³

This quotation is a good example of the combination of the two motives. The first one is an advice of staff. The second one is an outside pressure from public or interest groups. Frankel suggested that there can be a discrepancy between personal and national motivation in national interests. "The parallel between national values, goals and interests and those of the individual is not complete and the dangers of pushing it too far are obvious. The tendency to personalize the state and to compare its goals and needs with those of the individuals, if pushing too far, inevitably leads to confusion."⁴⁴

However, some motivations cannot be understood rationally. Probably they are rooted at the subconscious level. For instance, it is impossible to explain logically why Stalin needed to exterminate the majority of Soviet high-ranking military on the eve of the World War II when Hitler's intentions were an open secret.

⁴³ Hans Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, p. 259.

⁴⁴ Frankel, p. 115.

3. Values

According to the definition of values put forward by Professor Easton, they "can be ultimately reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the individual's total life-experiences."⁴⁵ Frankel drew a distinction between aspirational and actual levels of values. In his opinion, "We can distinguish between aspirational values which combine into a *vision of the good life*, meaning the state of affairs which a person would find most desirable, and operational *objectives (goals, ends)* for which he has to find *means* and to which he applies his *principles of behavior*; these combine into *policies or programs*."⁴⁶ Frankel also noted that in real life foreign policy is based on ideology and self-interest at the same time. To his mind, ideology as a value system is a synthesis of aspirational and actual policy. In international politics he draws a parallel between the idealist approach expressed by President Wilson and realist one expressed by his successors. In real life foreign policy is driven by both ideology and national interests. It is necessary to stress that too one-sided an approach is potentially dangerous for a nation. For example, according to Frankel the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was based on the combination of national interests, ideology and political power. The proclaimed dominance of ideology in the policy expressed in the Marxist postulate of proletarian internationalism led to enormous military and economic aid to allegedly socialist-oriented developing countries. At the same time competing with the United States, the Soviet Union tried to ensure its national interests and to enhance its political power in these countries by deploying military personnel, hardware and building military installations. Such foreign policy dominated by ideology resulted in a disastrous waste of material resources and was one of the reasons for economic collapse of the country.

At the decision-making level of analysis it is important to know the system of beliefs of the decision-making group or an individual decision-maker. It is indispensable to

⁴⁵ David Easter, *The Political System*, 1953. p. 221, cited in Frankel p. 116.

⁴⁶ Frankel, p. 116.

be aware of this because different systems of beliefs can result in different visions of the national interest and different ways to achieve it. For example, religious fanatics or those who are ready for martyrdom will stop at next to nothing to reach their goals. They may sacrifice their own lives along with the lives of thousands of their compatriots, let alone “enemies.”

I. THE SYSTEM DIMENSION

The formation of the national interest of a single state takes place not only on the basis of its interest in the objective and subjective aspects, but in the process of estimation and comparison of national interests of more than two subjects of international relations in a geopolitical system in the process of coinciding and clashing national interests of all the subjects of international relations involved. This comparison comprises, on the one hand, the geopolitical position of the subjects—i.e., the objective aspect—and on the other hand, the extent of the perception of the objective aspect and the policy pursued by them—i.e., the subjective aspect. The analysis of such a system approach can be presented in the following way. **A, B, C** and **D** are the objects of action, **X** is the subject of it.




Figure 3. Objects of Action on X

According to this scheme A trying to implement its interest in relation to X has to take into account the following variables:

1. Potential of A to do this;
2. Forecasted reaction of B, C and D to the action of A;
3. Possible reaction and internal evolution of X under the effect of A, B, C and D.

These variables should be taken into account at the stage of the planning and forecast as well as to be corrected during realization.

At the beginning of the 20th century according to the member of the Russian State Duma (Parliament) Milukov, in the Far East Russian national interests were being formed along the following lines, "The territorial enlargement of Russia could only be restricted by

1) the strength of Russia, 2) the parallel interests of England and Japan, 3) the future evolution of China.”⁴⁷

In the present world of growing interdependence and the threat of nuclear elimination, compatibility of national interests becomes a condition of human existence. Morgenthau noted, “A nation that seeks to pursue an intelligent and peaceful foreign policy cannot cease to comparing its own objectives and the objectives of other nations in the light of their compatibility.”⁴⁸ So, besides the interests of nations **A** and **B**, it is necessary to stress the interest of a system, whose existence becomes indispensable for all nations’ existence. A nation which stays away from the use of military means to achieve its national interest is interested in avoiding forceful clashes.

This leads to a conclusion that there is an interest of a system of nations. This system is an evolving structure with a harmonization of the interests of all the actors within it, creating a form of system stability. But as there is no absolute stability it is more precise to call it “dynamic stability.”




Figure 4. Dynamic Stability

⁴⁷ *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Sozyv 3. Sessiya 4. Stenographichesky Otschet, Part 2* (S-Peterburg. 1911), p. 3456.

⁴⁸ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power*, p. 518.

J. CLASSIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

This chapter will focus on the classification of the national interest. Some scholars consider that it is next to impossible to classify something so abstract, vague, subjective and at the same time objective. They think that, firstly, any classification tends to simplify the notion of the national interest and cannot present all the peculiarities of it, and secondly, that a real international environment is so complex that the frames of the classification tend to be too narrow. Undoubtedly, these judgments all have grounds. Nevertheless, commenting on such assumptions Frankel points out:

Real life does not readily yield to the logic of these clear-cut distinctions or to any other ones. While it is a mistake to try to force reality into strait-jacket of a conceptual scheme, each scheme can be helpful in the sorting out of some ambiguities and uncertainties of a specific situation; in fact, several schemes can be used simultaneously, provided their limited role is fully appreciated.⁴⁹

In order to evade the drawbacks described by the proponents of the classification of the national interest it is advisable to classify the notion applying two classification approaches offered by Joseph Frankel and Donald Nuechterlein.

1. Frankel's Approach

According to Frankel the term national interest can be classified at aspirational, operational, explanatory and polemical levels.

a. *Aspirational Level of the National Interest*

In theoretical phonetics there is such a term as phonema. This is a "pure sound" which does not exist in reality. Foreign language learners imitate foreign language sounds trying to achieve its purity, namely, to achieve ideal sound or phonema. What even native speakers pronounce is a sound distorted by them. For example, different people will pronounce sound A differently, though it still will be sound A, not B.

⁴⁹ Frankel, p. 53.

To a great extent, the notion of the aspirational national interest has a lot in common with the notion of the phonema. This interest is connected with an image of the international environment that is favorable for a nation. It is a set of desired ideals which, in fact, may not exist in real life or is impossible to achieve. The value of this interest is that it gives some sort of major directions for foreign policy. An example of aspirational interest can be seen in the US Government's "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" where the author's desire "to shape a world conducive to U.S. interests and consistent with American values..."⁵⁰

Frankel gives the following description of the aspirational national interest:

1. They are normally long-term interests;
2. They are generally rooted in history and/or ideology;
3. They command more attention from an opposition free of the restraints of, and the preoccupation with, the tasks of governing than from the actual government;
4. Even when they do not directly influence actual policy, they can provide purpose or direction, or at the least, a sense of hope;
5. They need not be fully articulated and co-ordinated and they can be contradictory;
6. They do not require a "feasibility study" and are rarely if ever costed;
7. They are determined by political will rather than by capabilities—ideology is a strong determinant.⁵¹

b. Operational Level of the National Interest

Unlike aspirational national interests, operational national interests are the subject of real policy and are really pursued. They have the following properties:

⁵⁰ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. (The White House, 1996), p. 9.

⁵¹ Frankel, p. 32.

1. They are usually short-term interests, capable of achievement within the foreseeable future;
2. They often, but not exclusively, stem from considerations of expediency or necessity;
3. They are the predominant concern of the government and /or party in power;
4. They are used in a descriptive rather than a normative form;
5. Owing to the practical problems of implementation, contradictions among them are less easily tolerated than among aspirations;
6. They are generally translated into politics which are based upon the assessment of their prospects of success and which can be at least approximately costed;
7. The crucial variable in their determination is found in capabilities rather than in political will. Hence the hypothesis can be advanced that classification of states by power is here more relevant than that by ideology. It is likely that all small states, whatever their ideology, merely react to overwhelming international stimuli; with them policy is distinct from positive purpose;
8. They can be systematically arranged into maximum and minimum programs, the former approximating aspirational interests. Such arrangement, however, depends upon systematic planning of foreign policy and rarely, if ever, actually takes place; only Soviet foreign policy in some of its aspects can be regarded as a reasonable example.⁵²

Frankel notes that if aspirational interests remained unchallenged for a long time they may lose their value and become a tradition or vanish in the long run. To illustrate this it is useful to look at the idea of mission in Russian foreign policy in the Balkan region. While it was one of determinants of that policy in the 19th century, it was on the wane during the 20th century and today it became more of a tradition. On the other hand, if operational interests remain unchallenged they may move to the category of aspirational ones or vanish completely.

⁵² Frankel, p. 32-33.

Another peculiarity is a contradiction between policies aimed at achieving these two levels of interests and decision-makers pursuing these policies. Frankel has in mind key political decision-makers who work out conceptions and those who implement these conceptions. When it comes to interests the former think deductively and tend to disregard costs or the process of fulfillment. They state what should be done. The latter work on the operational interests inductively and take care of benefits and costs and the fulfillment of the task. They try to fulfill this ideal task under the conditions of controversial reality preserving the task's original essence and preventing its distortion. An example of another contradiction is between the US 's aspirational interests to promote democracy around the world and its actual policy. US policy in relation to some Arab countries in the Gulf has nothing to do with aspirational interests, but solely operational ones, and is aimed at achieving the US national interests in a region considered vital by the United States.

c. Explanatory and Polemical Levels of National Interests

Frankel admits that these two levels have much in common and that is advisable to unite them for consideration. They are connected with the assessment and critique of foreign policy. As Frankel writes, "Its main role is to 'prove' oneself right and one's opponents wrong and the arguments are used for this purpose rather than for describing or prescribing."⁵³

2. Nuechterlein's Approach

Donald Nuechterlein offers a classification of US national interests based on the system categories and intensity of the interests which, with certain reservations, have a universal character.

In Nuechterlein's opinion US national interests can be divided into:

1. *Defense of Homeland*: Protection of the people, territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign dangers. This is usually referred to as the national defense interest...

⁵³ Frankel, p. 35.

2. *Economic Well-being*: Promotion of U.S. international trade and investment, including protection of private interests in foreign countries. This may be called the national economic interest.
3. *Favorable World Order* (international security): Establishment of a peaceful international environment in which disputes between nations can be resolved without resort to war and in which collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter or to cope with aggression. This is also referred to as the international security interest...
4. *Promotion of Values* (ideology): Promulgation of a set of values that the U.S. leaders believe to be universally good and worthy of emulation by other countries.⁵⁴

This classification can be useful in examining national interests of any country with the exception of the "promotion of values" category. Instead of this category it would be more advisable to use the one of "international prestige."

Another approach to classification is connected with evaluation of the intensity of the challenged interest. Nuechterlein maintains, "It is the intensity of concern about any basic interest at a given period of time that forms the basis of policy-making in foreign affairs. These intensities, or degrees of interest, constitute a different category that we will call 'transitory,' because they are subject to change depending on the government's perception of their urgency at any given time."⁵⁵ The term "transitory" means that all interests are taken into account and are evaluated but that various categories may be challenged to a different extent and, consequently, require different degrees of attention from the policy-makers.

Nuechterlein offers the following four-tiered scale of priorities:

- (1) survival interests, where the very existence of the nation is in peril;
- (2) vital interests, where probable serious harm to the security and well-being of the nation will result if strong measures, including military ones,

⁵⁴ Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Overcommitted. United States National Interests in the 1980s* (The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), p. 8.

⁵⁵ Nuechterlein, p. 9.

are not taken by the government within a short period of time; (3) major interests, where potential serious harm could come to the nation if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad; (4) peripheral (minor) interests, where little if any harm to the entire nation will result if “wait and see” policy is adopted.⁵⁶

Nuechterlein indicates the importance of the time dimension as a measurement of the interests. He notes, “Another way to measure the intensity of an interest is to use a time dimension: survival interests require the immediate attention of the President; vital interests require urgent planning in the executive branch; major interests require serious study; and peripheral ones suggest ‘watchful waiting.’”⁵⁷ If we take the time dimension as an independent variable and the categories of interests as dependent ones the correlation between them will appear in the following way:




Figure 5. Time Dimension and Categories of Interests

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 9-10.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

Explaining the scale of priorities Nuechterlein observes, "A survival interest exists when there is an imminent, credible threat of massive destruction to the homeland if another state's demands are not quickly met. Such crises are easy to detect because they are dramatic and involve an armed attack, or threat of attack, by one country on another's territory."⁵⁸ An example of a survival interest being at stake is the attack of the fascist Germany on the Soviet Union in 1941 or the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

According to Nuechterlein, "A vital interest differs from a survival one principally in the amount of time that a country has to decide how it will respond to an external threat. Vital interests involve economic, world-order, and ideological issues as well as defense of the homeland ones and may ultimately be as crucial to a country as direct threats to its independence. It is important to emphasize that a vital interest is *not* defined by the kind of policy actions a president takes in a crisis or serious international dispute; the actions are only symptomatic of the intensity of the interest."⁵⁹ An example of this category of interests being challenged is an attack on international oil resources.

Nuechterlein continues, "A major interest is one that a country considers to be important but not crucial to its well-being. These are issues or trends that can be negotiated with an adversary—whether they are economic, political, or ideological. Policy-makers usually come to the conclusion that negotiation and compromise, rather than confrontation, are desirable—even though the results can be painful."⁶⁰ An example of American major interest being challenged is the Arab oil embargo of 1973.

According to Nuechterlein, "A peripheral interest is one which does not seriously affect the well-being of the United States as a whole, even though it may be detrimental to the private interests of Americans conducting business abroad. These are issues that bear watching by the State Department and other government agencies, but they are a lower

⁵⁸ Nuechterlein, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

order of political, economic, or ideological magnitude.”⁶¹ An example of an American peripheral interest being challenged is the change of the government in Turkey.

3. The National Interest Matrix

Nuechterlein offers the national interest matrix as a conceptual framework to evaluate national interests. The vertical column is basic national interests while the horizontal row comprises four intensities of interest. Having changed the “promotion of values” category for “international prestige”, “favorable world order” for “favorable international environment” and “defense of homeland” for “military security” the matrix will look as follows:

Basic Interest at Stake	Intensity of Interest			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Military Security				
Economic Well-being				
Favorable International Environment				
International Prestige				

Nuechterlein emphasizes that the policy-makers’ task is defined by the extent to which a political or a military issue challenges different categories of national interests. As he writes: “Then he [the policy-maker] should estimate the intensity of interest that other countries have in the same issue, for each basic interest. Comparing the levels of interest at stake for the principal countries involved, a calculation can be made as to whether the issue is likely to be negotiable or whether it will probably lead to an armed confrontation.”⁶²

Using this matrix it is possible to measure the national interests of some participants in the Gulf war, namely, Kuwait, Iraq, the U.S. and Great Britain, as these interests were perceived by them.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁶² Ibid., p. 14.

Basic Interest at Stake	Intensity of Interest			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Military Security	Kuwait	Iraq		USA Britain
Economic Well-being	Kuwait	Iraq USA	Britain	
Favorable International Environment	Kuwait	Iraq USA	Britain	
International Prestige	Kuwait	Iraq USA	Britain	

a Military Security

According to this chart, all countries considered their military security to challenged but to a different extent. Only Kuwait, which fell victim of Iraq's aggression and whose territory was occupied, regarded this interest as survival. Military security for Iraq was vital because of the huge amount of allied forces involved into the operation, capable of penetrating into Iraq's territory. If these forces had advanced farther and the threat to Saddam Hussein's regime had become imminent, the vital interest at stake could have turned into a survival one. Due to the large distance between Iraq, on the one hand, and the U.S. and Great Britain, on the other, their military security was peripheral. That is why the preparation for the operation took as much time as it did as it was necessary for allied forces to concentrate troops and to mislead Hussein about their intentions.

b. Economic Well-being

The intensity of economic well-being was survival for Kuwait for the same reasons as for its military security. Iraq had vital economic interests at stake because it hoped to receive extra material resources and claimed to possess Kuwait's rich oil reserves. The US had a vital economic interest in the region because of oil. Britain considered its economic interest as major because traditionally Britain has been interested in having an economic presence in the Middle East.

c. Favorable International Environment

The intensity of such an interest as favorable international environment was at the level of survival for Kuwait because only by relying on its allies could Kuwait exist as an independent state. Iraq regarded the importance of a favorable international environment as vital because it could split Arab countries from the US and form the environment that was appropriate to attain its goals. The US concluded that a favorable international environment was vital because the strengthening of Saddam Hussein's regime could, firstly, break the existing system of states pursuing the policy consistent with America's basic values, and secondly, endanger a US strategic ally, as Israel and Arab countries loyal to the US. The intensity of this interest for Britain was major. Britain had the same interest as the US in the region, but due to less extensive British involvement in comparison with that of America the interest was major.

d. International Prestige

The intensity of this interest for Kuwait was survival. The existence of the country was at stake so the failure to survive as a state was equal to the complete loss of prestige. Iraq concluded that it had a vital interest. Iraq was aimed at demonstrating that despite economic sanctions it was still powerful and capable of its own resisting allied forces. So it hoped that this small victorious war would increase its prestige abroad. The US also had a vital interest in the category of international prestige. Saddam Hussein's victory would be a heavy blow for democracy and the prestige of the US as its guarantor. Besides, Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a good test to demonstrate US military and political capabilities in defending its allies. Britain followed the way paved by the US, but because of a smaller British involvement and a more limited role played by Britain in the region the intensity of the interest was major.

III. AMERICAN VIEWS OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN NATO ENLARGEMENT

A. GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES IN EUROPE

According to the most recent official statement of the US national security policy, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:"

The primary security imperative of the past half century--containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war--was gone. Instead, we confronted a complex array of new and old security challenges...⁶³

The disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to a new geopolitical situation. According to political scientist Kenneth Waltz the rigid bilateral European system and the presence of nuclear weapons (the hypothesis offered by John Gaddis in the journal *International Security*, Spring 1986, Vol. 10, No. 4) resulted in a more or less stable peace in Europe.

The Cold War was a long and at some points dangerous confrontation between the West and the East. However, primarily it was a competition where both sides tried to abide by both signed agreements and unwritten laws. Both sides played by fixed rules and did not interfere in each other's established spheres of interests. More or less stable and predictable confrontation was a peculiarity of that period. Nowadays the situation is different.

Today, Europe is best seen as standing at a crossroads: capable of moving towards either peaceful stability or chronic turmoil. As of 1993, Europe was divided into three separate parts that were not interacting a great deal: an inward-looking Western community, a neutral East Central Europe, and an internally consumed Russia.⁶⁴

There are two opposite assessments of the geopolitical development in Europe. The first one maintains that Europe has good prospects for peaceful development. This is the

⁶³ "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (The White House 1996), p. 1.

⁶⁴ Richard Kugler with Marianna Kozintseva, *Enlarging NATO. The Russia Factor* (RAND, 1996), pp.12-13.

foundation of the view of those who believe that the very notion of war in Europe is obsolete.

The idea that Europe may be vulnerable to sliding into another era of fragile geopolitics will be dismissed by optimists who judge that the current era has made history anachronistic. They argue that the combination of democracy, market economics, communications, technology, multilateral institutions, learned lessons, new attitudes, and other developments may be transforming international politics for the good.⁶⁵

On the other hand, according to another approach the present transitional period in Eastern Europe is turbulent and requires balanced political and military steps based on the calculation of costs and benefits. "The Cold War is over, but war itself is not over."⁶⁶ This situation may turn out to be more fragile in terms of the possibility of ethnic conflicts and local wars than the previous bilateral system.

Yet, ethnic hatred and romantic nationalism have produced rampant slaughter in the Balkans, suggesting that even if history is not springing back to life, it is definitely not yet dead.⁶⁷

Former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger emphasized the peculiarity of the present geopolitical situation in Europe in the following way:

Well, it is a different situation than it was during the Cold War. In the Cold War we could size our military forces in relation to specific threats. In the next period, we have to develop our military forces in regard to potential situations that might arise, even though we cannot define the individual threat precisely. And we do not have the advantage of a yardstick in which we simply measure how much the Soviet Union has. We have to think of potential situations of instability...⁶⁸

There is a view that an unstable situation in Eastern Europe may lead to some sort of anarchy. As scholar Richard Kugler argued:

⁶⁵ Kugler, p. 16.

⁶⁶ "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (The White House, 1996), p. 35.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.16.

...means a lack of central government or ordering principles to govern fundamental political relations. It especially means a lack of guaranteed security arrangements and assurances about the future. Anarchy can magnify already-existing conflicts. Moreover, anarchy can create a climate of uncertainty about the future...⁶⁹

An expert on NATO retired General William Odom, Director of the National Security Studies, at the Hudson Institute indicated more directly the location of potential danger:

Instability, civil violence, and dictatorship in the eastern part of Europe cannot but adversely affect the politics and economics of Western Europe. That means our interests in Europe are seriously threatened by the conditions and domestic developments in the former Warsaw Pact states.⁷⁰

The present geopolitical landscape does not just represent NATO, Russia and the buffer zone between them including all countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. General Odom believes:

Without NATO, or with NATO and outside it, Russia will probably succeed in setting most of the rest of Europe against Germany. Their [Russian officials] big challenge in the decades ahead is the struggle with Germany over Central Europe.⁷¹

So American and NATO interests as General Odom sees them are the following:

We have an interest in establishing a security framework in the region between Russia and Germany that threatens no one while it reassures all interested parties, both large and small, that there is no opportunity for competing powers to contest one another.⁷²

⁶⁸ *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate* (U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, 1995), p. 9.

⁶⁹ Kugler, p. 163.

⁷⁰ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate* (U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, 1995), p. 29.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

The security uncertainty of the position of countries in this zone and the fear of a Russian-German rivalry in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russian dominance in the former Soviet Republics explains the vector of NATO policy. Kissinger believes that the aim of the NATO strategy is how to bring together:

...two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia.⁷³

B. THE NEW NATO

According to the American view, NATO has to preserve its old task of collective defense. But under new geopolitical conditions in order to survive NATO also has to perform other tasks.

The first one is to contain instability. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" maintains that, "Enlarging the Alliance will promote our interests by reducing the risk of instability or conflict in Europe's eastern half..."⁷⁴

The second task is to widen the security zone through NATO enlargement.

NATO enlargement will not be aimed at replacing one division of Europe with a new one; its purpose is to enhance the security of all European states, members and nonmembers alike.⁷⁵

The third task is not adopted in open US official documents but it can be described by Kissinger's appropriate warning, "You don't buy an insurance policy after the fire starts."⁷⁶ This approach was expressed by the former National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who said:

The Russian obsession with big-power status, the growing desire to reconstitute a block of at least satellite states within the territory of the

⁷³ Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," *Washington Post* (19 December 1994), p. A27.

⁷⁴ "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," p. 38.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁷⁶ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 63.

former Soviet Union, and the effort to limit the sovereignty of the Central European states could produce a crisis with the West. In such case, an enlarged NATO would have no choice but to become again a defensive alliance against an external threat.⁷⁷

According to this task the alliance is aimed at a neocontainment of Russia.

The fourth task is closely connected with the above-mentioned ones and is based on the notion of "democratic peace," which asserts that democracies do not fight each other. This task is to promote and strengthen democracy in the eastern part of Europe.

Final imperative of this new strategy is to support the growth of democracy and individual freedoms that has begun in Russia, the nations of the former Soviet Union and Europe's former communist states.⁷⁸

The fifth task is to play the role of deterrence against anything that cannot be precisely assessed but can be perceived as a threat to NATO. At the debates in the US Congress, Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner noted, "The key way to deter danger to the United States is to maintain presence, to maintain the deployment of forces to sustain our alliances precisely to discourage the emergence of a threat."⁷⁹

These new tasks of NATO are based on new approaches:

To solve the problem of instability through "out of area operations." For the first time in its history NATO intends to conduct operations when none of the NATO members are attacked by an enemy. This function is extremely important for NATO. "As US Senator Lugar warned, NATO risks going 'out of business' if it does not go 'out of area.'"⁸⁰ Inevitably, all European countries of the CIS including Russia, being in the process of transition, fall into the category of unstable countries, thus they become the region of close attention of NATO and possibly a zone for "out of area operations."

⁷⁷ "A Plan for Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995), p. 27.

⁷⁸ "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," p. 39.

⁷⁹ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 50.

⁸⁰ *NATO: The Case for Enlargement. Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies*, (1993), p. 12.

To enlarge NATO. NATO enlargement achieves the role of the above--mentioned objectives and is a tool to achieve them at the same time. NATO peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations.

C. THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

In the post-Cold War period to a great extent the perception of threat became ambiguous and obscure. That complicated "the reading" of the situation and the definition of national interest priorities. Wisner declared:

It is easier to analyze a situation where you know you have a monolithic threat and you are organized to defend against it. Now, we have this highly diversified, multifaceted, messy set of instabilities that can come and really affect our national interests and our national security.⁸¹

Another problem is connected with the multiplicity of issues NATO enlargement is intended to address. "The West will be pursuing multiple objectives, not all of which are readily achievable or automatically compatible."⁸² On top of that, as Stephen Cimbala states, "Eastward enlargement further complicates an already overburdened policy agenda."⁸³

Another peculiarity of the current geopolitical situation is the return of the significance of the notion of the national interest. Since the end of ideological confrontation, at least, leading European powers tend to pursue their policy under growing interdependency but without losing sight of their national interests. According to Thucydides a common enemy makes alliances. The commonly perceived Soviet threat united NATO members and strengthened the alliance. Now it is no longer present case.

⁸¹ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 50.

⁸² Kugler, p. 195.

⁸³ "NATO Enlargement and Russia," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1996), p. 55.

Great uncertainty about where international politics is headed creates powerful incentives for many countries to fall back on national interests as a determinant of foreign policy. This trend is already noticeable even within the western community. The national interest provides a criterion for shaping diplomacy toward many age-old strategic dilemmas that are resurfacing.⁸⁴

The trend to more independent national decision-making aimed at pursuing national interests was confirmed at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin in June 1996. French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette commented at the meeting:

France is satisfied because for the first time in alliance history, Europe will really be able to express its personality...⁸⁵

What implications does this trend have for NATO and NATO enlargement in particular?

It has been argued that should NATO grow its cohesion and sense of common purpose inevitably will dissipate; that a larger NATO, exacerbated by significant cultural and geopolitical differences, will become unmanageable; and that reaching agreement between new and old members on important issues will prove difficult.⁸⁶

Going back to the purpose of NATO and its enlargement, it is obvious that to contain something so vague like instability is hard to fulfill. Moreover, it can be dangerous.

Without a common enemy to unite us, we may find that our conceptions of what constitutes national interest may very well divide us,⁸⁷ stressed Senator Biden.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

⁸⁵ *Washington Post*, 4 June 1996, p. 14A.

⁸⁶ *Heritage Foundation Report*, March 1, 1996.

⁸⁷ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 3.

In an emerging multipolar world diverging national interests of different countries may not be compatible and cannot always be easily accommodated to each other. The former US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted:

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat it would be quixotic to expect the alliance to display the same degree of cohesion or unity now as it did when the members felt directly threatened. Inevitably, differences will develop and may be strongly expressed. Open quarrels may occur.⁸⁸

An attempt to solve the problem of instability in Central and Eastern Europe by NATO enlargement may affect different categories of national interest of different countries. For example, an issue can fall into the category of major national interest for Germany, but a peripheral one for Britain, giving rise to a dispute between them. The problem will be more complicated to resolve if a larger number of countries have contradictions or some countries like Turkey and Greece take opposite positions. Even such “preparatory course” for NATO admission as Partnership for Peace Program may not iron out all the differences. During the discussions on NATO Senator Lugar noted, Partnership for Peace is an attempt at an amalgam of the Administration’s policies towards NATO, toward Central Europe, and toward Russia. It reflects of necessity the lowest common denominator and contains some inherent contradictions. It seeks to accommodate a variety of interests and, in the process, satisfies none, least of all American interests. Moreover, precisely because American and European interests with respect to Central Europe and Russia are not necessarily synonymous, the attempt to utilize the Partnership for Peace as the primary multilateral alliance vehicle to accommodate conflicting policies both within and among key Western allies toward the East can be nothing more than a stopgap measure and will likely spin off more parochial variations over time.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 72.

⁸⁹ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 13.

D. THE AREA OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

It is useful to examine what American images of Russian national interests there are in relation to NATO enlargement. This examination is significant for two reasons: first, it indicates that the notion of the national interest is not obsolete and is still important in foreign policy. Second, a better understanding of the diversity of approaches to the Russian national interests ensures better mutual understanding between NATO and the United States, on the one hand, and Russia on the other.

For this purpose it is necessary to examine the views on the Russian national interest of both proponents and opponents of NATO enlargement. This examination will focus on the following variables:

- Attitudes to NATO enlargement.
- Theoretical foundations of the positions.
- Russian national interest as threat assessment.
- The sphere of the Russian national interests.
- The accommodation of the interests of NATO and Russia through institutionalization of their relations.

There are two different rationales for what Russian national interests are and why enlargement should be pursued, as will be discussed below in terms of firm maximalists and flexible maximalists. Also another rational for what Russian national interests are and why NATO enlargement should not occur will be discussed in terms of minimalists. After these theoretical constructs are created and examined the following hypothesis connected with the US official position on these issues will be tested.

- **HYPOTHESIS 1.** The US official position fits any of the above-mentioned positions.
- **HYPOTHESIS 2.** The US official position does not fit any of the above-mentioned positions and is unique in its character.

E. THE POSITION OF FIRM MAXIMALISTS

The representatives of this group believe that the enlargement is indispensable and urgent.

1. Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical foundation of the firm maximalists' position is based on the following variables.

The first variable is connected with the determinants of foreign policy. The proponents of this position consider that Soviet foreign policy was determined by ideological and geopolitical factors. After the end of the Cold War Russian foreign policy has undergone substantial conceptual changes. The firm maximalists maintain that the ideological factor as determinant of the present Russian foreign policy is gone. However, Russia is returning to its pre revolutionary of 1917 geopolitical and the national interest determinants of its foreign policy. Brzezinski emphasized:

Prevailing Russian thinking about central Europe is an extension of this proto-imperial approach.⁹⁰

Kissinger was more specific, saying that one of these factors is expansionism. He stressed:

Yet creeping expansionism has been the recurring theme of Russian history. For four centuries, Russia has subordinated the well-being of its own population to this outward thrust and threatened all its population with it. In the Russian mind, the centuries of sacrifice have been transmuted into a mission, partly on behalf of security, partly in the service of an alleged Russian superior morality.⁹¹

He also spoke about two schools of thought noting:

One is that we should try to concentrate on shaping Russian domestic institutions and supporting particular leaders. There is another school of thought to which I belong that holds we are likely to be most effective by trying to affect Russian foreign policy. We dealt with in the Cold War both

⁹⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 2 (1994), p. 76.

⁹¹ Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad," *Newsweek*, June 17, 1996, p. 42.

communism and imperialism, and while communism has been defeated, the trend toward imperialism still exists.⁹²

At the debates in the US Congress, speaking about diversity of opinions Arnold Horelick of RAND highlighted one of the them:

A geopolitical orientated view that holds Russia, on virtually existential grounds, is simply fated to remain an outside power; not capable of being assimilated by the West; driven by its history, geography, and traditions to be an expansionist force in world politics; and extremely unlikely to overcome its deeply ingrained authoritarianism.⁹³

The second variable deals with the view of firm maximalists, who see Russia as a defeated enemy in the Cold War. But in Brzezinski's opinion being defeated did not much alter the mentality of Russian statesmen or Russian foreign policy. One of those features, as he indicated, is "great power mentality." Brzezinski noted, "Russia is a defeated power. After 70 years of communism she lost a titanic struggle. To say 'it was not Russia but the Soviet Union' means to escape from reality. It was Russia in the name of the Soviet Union. She challenged the United States. It lost. Now it has a chance to become a mature, democratic, European state through deep, responsible, and full reconstruction. But for this one should not have illusions that Russia is a great power. It is necessary to get rid of this way of thinking."⁹⁴ Such an attitude is in line with those, who consider as Senator Lugar, said that:

enlargement is linked to U.S. support for Bosnian Muslims, as well as Ukraine. These moves have been seen as part of a larger strategic design to consolidate the geostrategic gains of the Cold War at Russia's expense.⁹⁵

⁹² *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p.9.

⁹³ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 15-16.

⁹⁴ *Segodnya*, August 19, 1994, p. 9.

⁹⁵ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 46.

As a strategic illustration of such gains Brzezinski offered a new strategy.

According to him:

The central goal of a realistic and long-term grand strategy should be the consolidation of geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union. That goal defines more appropriate the long-term American interest, irrespective of whether in the near future Russia does not become an accommodating democracy.⁹⁶

In another interview Brzezinski described the situation in Russia:

...as messy, as somewhat unstable, and as part and parcel of a long-term historical process that will not produce either stability or democracy in Russia on a firm, secure basis for some time to come. The loss of empire has further compounded the difficulties of the post-Communist transformation in Russia. Nonetheless, in the long run I am hopeful; but I don't have any naive expectations about the near future.⁹⁷

Brzezinski's controversial position indicates the controversy of the whole position of firm maximalists. Firstly, they do not believe the possibility of democratic development of Russia. Secondly, even if reforms pave the way to democracy their success is not likely to change the nature of Russia and will not mean a big shift in the US strategy towards Russia. In terms of geopolitical pluralism the most important issue for the United States is to prevent the formation on the territory of the former Soviet Union of a new state, democratic or not, whose power would be comparable with the United States.

The third variable is connected with either historic rivalry or arrangements between Germany and Russia. The firm maximalists sense that as Paula Dobriansky noted:

Germany would have a tremendous temptation to enter into an arrangement with Russia and that Moscow would be certain to exploit it.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Brzezinski, p. 79.

⁹⁷ Foreign Affairs with Zbigniew Brzezinski, *IC Interview*, October 24, 1996.

⁹⁸ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 64.

In her opinion, today geopolitical situation in Europe resembles the one of 1938. Dobriansky stated:

Essentially they [Central European countries] feel like pawns in a complicated minuet between Russia and the West. As the Czechs used to say about Munich: "About us, without us." It is imperative that we avoid such negative historical parallelisms.⁹⁹

Such position indicates that some firm maximalists are suspicious about future German pattern of behavior and definitely distrust the one of Russia. They see the way out of this situation in the filling the so called security vacuum between Germany and Russia.

According to the firm maximalists view, the best case scenario of Russian national interests in Europe are not compatible with America's and may cause friction. The worst case scenario, which is more likely, is that they will pose a danger. Firm maximalists focus on two key points. The first one is a historic determinant, namely, expansionism. As Henry Kissinger maintained:

If we seek genuine reforms in Russia, its leaders must be brought to understand that a return to historic drives will replicate the debacles of the past. NATO expansion requires a decision, not a study; its absence will tempt an even further thrust to expand Russia's strategic frontiers.¹⁰⁰

The second one is a combination of historic and geopolitical considerations. It boils down to a historic rivalry between Germany and Russia which received impetus after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. As the former National Security Adviser Brzezinski puts it:

...the right course is to insist firmly that the gradual expansion of NATO eastward is not a matter of 'drawing a new line' ... but of avoiding a security vacuum between Russia and NATO...¹⁰¹

In turn Kissinger holds:

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁰⁰ Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad," *Newsweek* June 17, 1996. p. 43.

¹⁰¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 2, 1994, p. 82.

This is even more true of NATO expansion--a subject on which administration ambivalence threatens to create a gray zone in Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, potentially tempting historic Russian drives to create political and strategic vacuums around its periphery.¹⁰²

These considerations are based on the assumption that international politics is coming back to traditional politics but in another international environment. In this connection Robert Zoellick stated, "While the cold war is history, geopolitics is not at an end."¹⁰³ In his opinion, the nature of the Russian foreign policy has not changed much. That is why taking advantage of the current geopolitical realities, the strategy of the West through NATO enlargement should be aimed at containment and deterrence of Russia by creating new security architecture. Zoellick underlined:

For centuries, Russia has sought to dominate these countries. It might naturally seek to do so again if we do not establish a new system that becomes the basis for a new security perspective. After World War II, we prevented a return to centuries-old conflicts in Western Europe by creating a new diplomatic architecture. Now we must quiet old competitions in Eastern Europe by extending our architecture eastward.¹⁰⁴

These considerations require a strategy capable of both deterring and resisting all such trends. In general terms, this strategy can be called "neocontainment of Russia within her borders." More specifically, firm maximalists tend to adopt "The Strategy of Neocontainment with Mixed Power Projection and Forward Presence." This strategy implies:

- Medium threat, medium warning time, forward defense not imperative
- Low or no Allied presence on the territory of Eastern European countries in peacetime

¹⁰² Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad," p. 43.

¹⁰³ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

- Requirement of the prepositioning of equipment with strong Allied mobility assets¹⁰⁵

The position of firm maximalists on path to NATO enlargement is the following.¹⁰⁶

Path	Rationale	Assumption	Timetable	Criteria	Who decides
Project stability	Provide political or security anchor	Security vacuum, Russian expansionism	Fast track	Political, strategic	NATO, East-Central Europe

Table 1. Maximalists Path to NATO Enlargement

F. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT

Examining the Russian national interest in terms of the threat assessment to Western and Eastern Europe, firm maximalists indicate two factors. The first one is purely military and is in line with "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." The Strategy highlights US intelligence priorities in relation to the most serious threats and focuses on "countries that possess strategic nuclear forces that can pose a threat to the United States and its allies."¹⁰⁷ Being a nuclear power Russia falls into this category. The second factor is more diverse. At the Congressional Testimony, former Bush Administration official Robert Zoellick claimed:

I tend to agree with General Odom that the nature of the threat does not have to be a formal military one; there are lots of things Russia can do separate from that.¹⁰⁸

Admitting that there is no imminent threat from Russia, firm maximalists like Zoellick indicate that in case of failure to build strong democracy in Russia the leadership might promote its national interests beyond Russian borders, in order "to reassert Russian control

¹⁰⁵ Adapted from Ronald Asmus information. *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 57.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁰⁷ "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," p. 24.

¹⁰⁸ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 37.

over Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and to make occasional menacing comments about Ukraine and the Baltic republics.”¹⁰⁹ As General Odom stressed, another:

...aspect of the threat from Russia is troublemaking diplomacy. We already see signs of it. Russia has supported Serbia against Bosnia and Croatia, citing its longstanding ties to the Serbs as something that is natural and for us to accept as given and inexorable. As time passes and differences among West European states surface, Russian diplomacy will try to exploit them, making as much mischief as possible.¹¹⁰

This attitude is the reaction to the more national interest-oriented, and less ideologically-oriented, Russian foreign policy of today. Basically, the position of firm maximalists is rightly described by Anatol Lieven, who noted:

All public discussions in Poland, and much of it in the United States, on the part of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Robert Dole, and others, has been conducted in terms of the need to contain a presumed Russian threat and to prevent Russia from exerting influence on its neighbors--influence that is automatically viewed as illegitimate and threatening to the West.¹¹¹

G. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

Firm maximalists oppose the idea of the division of Europe into spheres of interests among European powers in general and for Russia in particular. Analyzing the driving force of the position of the proponents for fast NATO enlargement George Moffett noted:

The argument for rapid expansion is that it would quickly remove ambiguity about the future of central Europe, sending an unmistakable signal to Russia, while it is still weak, that the region is forever off limits. If NATO does not expand now, rapid expansionists insist, it will languish

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 27.

¹¹¹ Anatol Lieven, “A New Iron Curtain; Implications of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Eastward Expansion for Russia,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, (January 1996).

because it will become irrelevant to the new security challenges that face Europe.¹¹²

Zoellick stressed:

We want to make clear to the Russians, as well as to the Eastern Europeans and the Germans, that these new democracies are also not in Russia's sphere of influence.¹¹³

As it was indicated above, the trend in Russian diplomatic activity to widen the area of the Russian national interest beyond its borders is regarded as menacing. Firm maximalists claim that NATO enlargement would prevent any repeat of the Yalta-like situation in the immediate post Cold War period.

Since the end of the second World War, we insisted that Russia had no special rights in either Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, or any other Warsaw Pact nation. We also took the position that the Soviet Union had no right to incorporate the Baltic States into its own government.¹¹⁴

Former US Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Max Kampelman emphasized. Today, according to this position, the most efficient way to stop the spread of the Russian national interests to Central and Eastern European countries is by NATO enlargement. Ambassador Kampelman maintained:

What is the purpose of NATO? Is this forward deployment of force to stop the Soviet Union? The truth is, half the people writing Op-Ed pieces, who advocate early admission, not all but half, are suggesting it for one simple reason: It relates to Russia; nothing else. They think there is a possibility of an aggressive, Nationalist, imperialist Russian revival.¹¹⁵

¹¹² George Moffett, "How Clinton Will Mollify Russians on NATO's Role," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 1995.

¹¹³ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 8.

¹¹⁴ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 78.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

Another fear was expressed by a scholar Holger Mey, who asks:

Would a 'democratic' Russia no longer have a national interest in the Baltic states? Would democracy prevent Russia from having a geostrategic interest in warm-water harbors in the Indian Ocean? Interests like those are not without legitimacy per se, but we don't know yet how Russia might pursue those interests and to what extent those interests are compatible with ours.¹¹⁶

The proponents of the firm maximalist position take a mixed and controversial view. On the one hand, when they speak about geopolitical determinism and foreign policy based on national interests they talk *realpolitik*. On the other hand, when they speak about a "democratic peace" their attitude is based on the ideas of international liberalism. They are interested in seeing Russia be a democratic country, but at the same time they do not believe that democracy will change the "imperial" character of Russian foreign policy and fear that Russia will follow the pattern of behavior typical for tsarist and Soviet period. For example, Brzezinski imagined Russian thinking in the following way:

Central Europe is not to be permitted to become an organic part of an integrating Europe, and especially of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The region is explicitly designated as an area of special Russian interest and influence, including--to the new military doctrine--the right to object to 'the expansion of military blocs or alliances' (i.e., NATO) into the region.¹¹⁷

It is curious that their policy towards Russia is rooted in *realpolitik* while the policy towards Eastern European countries including former Soviet Republics is based on international liberalism. In this case, it is necessary to admit that either the conception of "democratic peace" does not work, at least, not for Russia and efforts to strengthen democracy do not guarantee peace or that Russia is not on the road to democracy.

¹¹⁶ Holger H. Mey, "View from Germany. New Members-New Missions: The Real Issues Behind the New NATO Debate," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 3, no. 2, (1994), p. 226.

¹¹⁷ Brzezinski, p. 77.

Beyond a structural-level analysis it is necessary to examine how the national interests are defined on the level of political decision--making. In his report to the US Congress Senator Lugar stressed:

We laid down our objective and then worked with the Russians to achieve it. We seized the opportunity before the window closed. We knew what we wanted [which was German reunification]. In the case of Central Europe, we apparently do not. We need to define our interests and objectives and then to work with the Russians, not the other way around.¹¹⁸

The aim of such a policy is not just to isolate Russia but to affect her national interests in order to shape them in accordance with American concerns. In his statement Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Stephen Oxman stressed, "Russia's integration into the European community depends upon its acceptance of international standards of conduct outside its borders."¹¹⁹ Robert Zoellick agrees: "We should credit the Russians with the capability to pursue their own interests."¹²⁰ However, he does not exclude the possibility of differences in Russian and American interests:

Given the great uncertainties about Russia's political future, it would certainly be a mistake to try to fine-tune our policy to suit the twists and turns of Russia's internal debates. If Russia's reforms succeed, we will want to try to integrate it into what I hope will be growing transatlantic and global communities based roughly on our values.¹²¹

Thus, according to this approach the Russian national interests should be shaped by the United States and NATO and limited within Russian borders. Otherwise, as Zoellick noted:

¹¹⁸ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 14.

¹¹⁹ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994), p. 50.

¹²⁰ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 10.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Ambiguous US and Western reactions to instability and insecurity signal uncertainty and lack of commitment, which open the way for those tempted to establish their own order.¹²²

H. ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS

Firm maximalists do not reject the idea of accommodation of the interests of NATO and Russia through institutionalization of their relations. Regarding Russia as a defeated power in the Cold War they do not want “to lose” it in the post-Cold War period. As Senator Lugar stressed:

The administration has undertaken a ‘dual track’ strategy to complement its intra-NATO deliberations on enlargement with an approach to Russia on possible institutional arrangements between NATO and the Russian Federation.¹²³

Firm maximalists attach great importance to accommodation of the interests of NATO and Russia through institutionalization of their relations even in the case of the unfavorable scenario. Zoellick maintained:

Even if Russia’s reforms do not succeed, we will continue to have interest in working with Russia on topics like nuclear disarmament, proliferation, and regional stability.¹²⁴

This position can be explained by rich experience of doing business in the above-mentioned fields with the Soviet Union even when the Cold War was in full swing and deep understanding of the significance of these issues. Nevertheless, among maximalists there is a diversity of views on this issue. For example, such an extremely firm maximalist as Brzezinski has said:

Pursuing geopolitical pluralism should also entail a more deliberate expansion of the scope and perimeter of European security. The deliberate

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 2.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

promotion of a larger and more secure Europe need not be viewed as an anti-Russian policy, for the inclusion in NATO of several Central European democracies could be coupled with a simultaneous treaty of alliance and cooperation between NATO and Russia.¹²⁵

But Brzezinski's understanding of cooperation is a peculiar one. He remarked:

First of all, I am not saying that it is not necessary to cooperate with Russia. I am saying that mature cooperation cannot be now. A partner is the country which is ready to act mutually, effectively and responsibly with its allies. Russia is not a partner now. She is a client.¹²⁶

At the same time others regard Russia as an equal partner with her security anxieties. This position is based on two considerations. According to Zoellick, one of these is:

...combining enlargement with discussions about a NATO--Russian treaty or new arrangements for security consultations in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe--what was the old CSCE.¹²⁷

On the other hand, as Stanley Sloan has argued:

To deal with Russian concerns, Kissinger proposes a security treaty between NATO and Russia. According to Kissinger, such a treaty would make it clear that the NATO goal is to promote security cooperation, not confrontation in Europe. The NATO countries would accept limitations on deployment of NATO forces on the territories of new members, and special new consultative procedures would be established between NATO and Russia.¹²⁸

General Odom offered another institutional vehicle:

NATO expansion has to be accompanied with some very other constructive policies on OSCE and bringing the Russians into the G-7. In

¹²⁵ Brzezinski, p. 81.

¹²⁶ *Segodnya*, August 19, 1994, p. 9.

¹²⁷ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 9.

¹²⁸ Stanley R. Sloan "US Perspectives on NATO's Future," *International Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, April 1995, p. 223.

other words, we must create a balance of power and structure for the rest of Europe as well.¹²⁹

I. THE POSITION OF FLEXIBLE MAXIMALISTS

Flexible maximalists consider that NATO enlargement is necessary but for reasons other than those cited by firm maximalists.

J. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE POSITION

The proponents of this approach, as Horelick noted, "Somehow recognize Russia's special status as a unique European power."¹³⁰ They believe that Russia's status should be taken into account and Russia should be treated differently from other European countries. Flexible maximalists also consider that Russian foreign policy is not doomed to be imperialistic. Willing to agree that Russia is still in the process of a search for its place in post-Cold War Europe, this group thinks that though NATO enlargement is necessary it is not immediately aimed at Russia. They tend to perceive Russian national interests differently from firm maximalists and are more ready to accept the realities of such interests.

In their opinion, NATO enlargement is connected with the promotion of democracy, but not with power projection in new territory and is not aimed against any particular country including Russia. They argue that, first, Russian national interests are less belligerent and, second, Russia is less capable of threatening other's interests. Flexible maximalists have a misgiving that Russia may be mistreated as a result of rapid NATO enlargement with elements of containment. In The Christian Science Monitor Moffett noted about the necessity to relinquish

...the automatic assumption that Russia will once again be an expansionist power. That means treating Russia after the cold war like the

¹²⁹ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 40.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

European powers treated France after the Napoleonic wars and Germany after World War II.¹³¹

Flexible maximalists maintain that the main source of danger to the interests of Western democracies and the countries in transition to democracy is regional instability. The proponents of this assessment do not indicate particular countries responsible for that. However, they suppose that Russia can become one of them. In this case an appropriate strategy could be crisis management. In their opinion, this strategy is aimed at localization of the crisis at an early stage for further solution.

This strategy can be called "Crisis Management with Elements of Power Projection Strategy" which implies:

- Low threat, long warning time, forward defense not imperative
- No Allied presence on the territory of the Eastern European countries in peacetime; reliance on power projection in crisis
- Requirement of the strong Allied mobility assets¹³²

The position of flexible maximalists on path to NATO enlargement is the following:¹³³

Path	Rationale	Assumption	Timetable	Criteria	Who Decides
Evolutionary	Part of overall Western Integration	No major security problem	Moderate fast track	Political, economic	NATO, East-Central Europe

Table 2. Flexible Maximalists Path to NATO Enlargement

K. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT

Flexible maximalists do not regard Russia as an ultimately belligerent country. This is what an expert on NATO, retired General Galvin, said in the US Congress:

¹³¹ Moffett.

¹³² *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 57.

¹³³ The information is adapted from Ronald Asmus. *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 55.

If what we think we are interested in is continuing the old idea of forward defense and flexible response against the former Soviet Union or against Russia now, and if we go to these countries and say your criteria for joining NATO is that you build a powerful military force that we are satisfied with, what is that force for? Is that force for crisis management? Or is that a force because we are creating some kind of defense against Russia? We have to ask ourselves that hard question, because if we are asking Russia to be a partner with us and with other countries in maintaining the peace in Europe, then I think we are on the right track. If we are going to try to do something else, then I do not understand why we are going East.¹³⁴

Those who share this approach are more willing to view Russia as a partner, though a difficult one, and are ready to take into account Russian interests in NATO enlargement. General Galvin noted:

I think we should say to the Russians: An expanded NATO, under those circumstances with that strategy, equals peace and stability, and should be something that the Russians would support. And maybe even, be part of it. Now, this is very different from saying, 'We are going to expand to the East, in order to protect these countries.' Protect them, against what? We will then, therefore, have a response from the Russians. I am not saying that we have to be passing everything through the Duma in order to find out whether or not we can do it.¹³⁵

Despite the fact that retired General Odom is more of a "firm maximalist," he gave a precise threat assessment to security in Europe typical for "flexible maximalists." At the discussions in the US Congress he noted:

Our interests in Europe are facing growing and diverse threats-not the old Soviet military type threat, but a spectrum of diffuse and not always clear and present dangers. They are new in the sense that we did not face them in Central Europe during the cold war. They are old and familiar, however, if

¹³⁴ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 108.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

we recognize that we had to deal with precisely these kinds of threats in Western Europe in 1949.”¹³⁶

L. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

Flexible maximalists have a different approach from firm maximalists to the range of the sphere of Russian national interests. Analyzing sphere of influence, political scientist James Kurth noted:

A great power will define the limits of its sphere according to its shifting perception of the diplomatic, economic, and military interests at stake. Most experienced diplomats, area specialists, and scholarly experts have a quite clear and consistent sense of what a particular great power considers to be its necessary and legitimate sphere of influence. It is grounded in historical and cultural traditions, which persist throughout the ups and downs of power and the zig and zags of interest.¹³⁷

The proponents of this group agree, though to a greater or lesser extent that Russia being a great European country, has a wide sphere of interests going beyond Russian borders. They also agree that Russian national interests should be allowed to go beyond Russian borders, within former Soviet Republics, but provided, Russia not apply pressure to other countries or stoppage of gas supplies, against them.

What differentiates the two groups of NATO enlargement proponents is their thinking in terms of sphere of influence. Firm maximalists do not agree to allowing any sphere of Russian national interests. But the common feature of these approaches is that they believe that the benefits of the enlargement outweigh the costs. More specifically what differentiates the two groups' views is to the extent to which they take into account Russian national interests and the size of the area of these interests. Flexible maximalists tend to take a more moderate approach. Stephen Oxman stated:

¹³⁶ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 29.

¹³⁷ James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy. A Pattern of History," *The National Interest*, no. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 13

We recognized that the countries of the East are different from each other. There would be a process of self-differentiation, and we felt this was a good way to meet that concern and to balance the various interests at stake.¹³⁸

They admit the possibility of the spreading of Russian national interests, within certain limitations, within the countries of the CIS. Firm maximalists, meanwhile reject that, insisting that Russian interests should remain within Russian borders.

M. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS

Taking into account the size of Russia and her difference as a power unique from other European countries, flexible maximalists consider that it is necessary to establish a special relationship between NATO and Russia. They also maintain that this accommodation of interests through institutionalization of NATO-Russia relations is significant for a number of reasons:

1. Russia will not feel isolated and encircled by a hostile alliance.
2. Accommodation of interests through institutionalization of NATO-Russia relations will promote an international environment more favorable for Russia.
3. Transparency and predictability of the policies will be ensured.
4. Russia's status as a great power in Europe will be confirmed.
5. It will make it possible to influence and to bring closer to Western standards Russian policy-making.
6. Russia will have an opportunity to express its views before NATO makes a decision, but not after.

The special relationship with Russia is a goal and an instrument for the US and NATO at the same time. It is an instrument because:

¹³⁸ *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994), p. 3.

...the institutional web offers the West useful avenues to, procedures for, and ways of influencing strategic affairs outside its enlarged borders.¹³⁹

N. THE POSITION OF MINIMALISTS

The representatives of this group come out against NATO enlargement unless Russia goes sour.

O. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

The theoretical foundation of the minimalists is based on the following considerations:

- They reject historic or geopolitical predetermination of the foreign policy of any country in general and Russia in particular. The distinguished historian of Russia Martin Malia emphasized: "Nations are not constants. It is pseudowisdom to deduce future prospects mechanically from past precedents."¹⁴⁰ Along this line Michael Mandelbaum specified what he thought about NATO enlargement and Russia. In his opinion: "Russia may again seek to disturb the peace of Europe but is not destined to do so. There is no national equivalent of a genetic predisposition to aggression. Neither Russia in general nor Russian foreign policy in particular is an impersonal, inevitable force of nature."¹⁴¹
- The collapse of communism paved the way to democracy in Russia. Under present conditions NATO enlargement can hamper democratic processes in Russia.
- The geopolitical changes created an international environment which Russia could perceive as non-hostile and basically compatible with Russian national interests.

¹³⁹ Richard Kugler with Marianna Kozintseva, *Enlarging NATO: The Russian Factor* (RAND, 1996), p. 214.

¹⁴⁰ "Traditions, Ideology and Pragmatism in the Formation of Russian Foreign Policy," in *The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensen (The United States Institute of Peace, Washington: , 1994), p. 47, cited in Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3 (1995), p. 11.

¹⁴¹ Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3 (1995), p. 11.

The task of the West is to do its best to facilitate strengthening this trend, taking into account Russian concerns and interests. The most rational way to accomplish that is to preserve the status quo in Europe for some time. An attempt to change the present situation by NATO enlargement could break the fragile balance of interests. Arnold Horelick has called this attitude:

A neo-Wilsonian internationalist belief in the cardinal importance of promoting Russia's democratic development and integration into the Western-led international community with a more hardnosed Russocentric view that basic national security interests require a priority on maintaining stable conditions for U.S.-Russian cooperation in managing nuclear weapons command and control, nuclear reduction and dismantling.¹⁴²

Looking at this issue from the standpoint of realpolitik, the great power statesman's responsibilities, according to Fareed Zakaria, are:

...to maximize his country's security and influence in the world; to allow for the inevitable shifts in international power and prestige; and finally, to preclude or preempt a general war.¹⁴³

Insecurity is only one side of a coin when there is a disbalance of power. The other side is the perception of insecurity in the minds of policy-makers. So NATO enlargement cannot ensure security if only one side feels insecure. Coming back to the mentioned earlier Spykman's assertion that there is more safety in the balanced power than in the words of good intentions, Russian weakened capabilities pose less danger for the West and Russian neighbors than Western capabilities for Russia. In this light, it is not quite clear why Western leaders speaking about their good intentions are more trustworthy than Russian leaders speaking about the same. As George Kennan said recently:

My goodness, look at our Monroe Doctrine; every great power is sensitive about having its immediate neighbors connected with another great military power.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 16.

¹⁴³ Fareed Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished," *The National Interest* (Winter 1992/93), p. 29.

Former US Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock assessed the decision on NATO enlargement as an inadequate and dangerous line-drawing between the NATO members and Russia. He noted:

To proceed with an automatic expansion or something that looked like one would be the political counterpart of France's attempt to avoid World War II by building a Maginot line. By focusing on the threats of the past, France failed to grasp the threats of the future, and that, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion is precisely the mistake the advocates of rapid NATO expansion make today.¹⁴⁵

Arguing with the proponents of NATO enlargement minimalists disagree with the assumption that NATO will bring stability in the region. They make a point that first of all, NATO is a military alliance but not a "club for democracies" or "a vehicle for market reforms." The former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Pat Holt wrote:

NATO is not the only stabilizing influence available for Eastern Europe. NATO might even be more unsettling than stabilizing. Any expansion eastward would inevitably carry with it the aura of NATO's cold-war origins as an anti-Soviet alliance. Efforts to disguise this are unlikely to succeed.¹⁴⁶

Basically, opposing immediate NATO enlargement minimalists presume that as Moffett noted:

The US needs to base its policy on actual Russian behavior... "Integrate if possible, isolate if necessary."¹⁴⁷

Charles Kupchan warned in his report on NATO and cited by Moffett in *The Christian Science Monitor*. In this connection minimalists tend to adopt the following position:¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ *U.S. News & World Report*, March 11, 1996, p 41.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁴⁶ Pat Holt, "NATO Must Think First Before Expanding East," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 1, 1995.

¹⁴⁷ Moffett.

¹⁴⁸ This information is adapted from Ronald Asmus, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 55.

Position	Rationale	Assumption	Timetable	Criteria	Who Decides
Strategic response	Respond to Russian threat	Enlargement not needed, unless Russia goes sour	Situation in Russia is catalyst	Strategic	Events in Russia

Table 3. Connection Maximalists Path to NATO Enlargement

P. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT

According to classical realist theory, there were “two keys for understanding international politics: the capabilities and the interests of states.”¹⁴⁹ In terms of power, Russian capabilities have declined and do not threaten the West. Besides, there are no indications that Russia has aggressive intentions towards its neighbors. Russia’s national interests are to promote an international environment that is favorable to it. To a great extent the position of the opponents of NATO enlargement is based on their belief that Soviet ideology is truly extinct and that Russia no longer constitutes a threat to the West, at least at present. They consider that the Russian national interests are still in the process of formulation. This can be seen in the anxiety expressed by Dr. Horelick in his Congressional testimony that there are:

...strategic consequences that NATO expansion is likely to have for Russia’s long-term search for a new post-Soviet post-Communist identity, and for a place in the post-cold war world.¹⁵⁰

The proponents of this approach believe that such a NATO move will push Russia in the wrong direction in this search. It will leave the country outside European security frameworks and will assume that Russian national interests are incompatible with NATO’s interests. Horelick also stated:

The other area concerns that are strongest for NATO lie to the south rather than to the east of NATO Europe.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 39.

¹⁵⁰ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 15.

He went on to say:

I also made my point, that whatever marginal contribution it makes to enhance the sense of secure well-being of East Central Europe, which in my judgment, is not physically threatened for the foreseeable future by Russia.¹⁵²

And Ambassador Matlock maintained:

The most serious potential security threat to Europe as a whole is not likely to be from a resurgent, imperialistic Russia sweeping over and absorbing other nations as it has at times in the past, but a Fragmented Russia in which weapons of mass destruction in its possession slip out of its responsible control.¹⁵³

Q. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

Minimalists attitude to the sphere of Russian national interests is based on the assumption that Russia being a great power has its own legitimate interests and security concerns outside its borders. At the structural level the conceptual position of the minimalists can be explained by George Kennan's above-mentioned attitude to NATO enlargement and Russia. This attitude is in line with the idea expressed by the scholar James Kurth:

A full and formal expansion of NATO into these countries [Central European countries] would threaten Russia's conception of its vital security interests¹⁵⁴

In a way, what he offers is in accord with the approach of Stephen Van Evera, who noted:

Eastern Europe's status should be settled by 'Finlandizing' the region: the West would promise not to incorporate East European states into

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁵⁴ James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy," *The National Interest*, no. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 16.

Western military alliances or to base forces on their territory, while the Soviet Union would guarantee their complete domestic freedom.¹⁵⁵

Though the Soviet Union does not exist today and it is too late to speak about full realization of the offer of "Finlandizing" the region, this idea is similar to Kurth's, also aimed at keeping the balance of security interests of all sides concerned. Kurth stated:

A viable model for the future of Central and Eastern Europe may be found in the Cold War past of NATO's Northern Flank. Each of these three northern countries [Finland, Sweden, and Norway] was politically independent both superpowers during the Cold War, but their security positions were different. Finland was formally neutral, but within the Soviet security zone. Sweden was formally neutral, but maintained the military capability to defend its neutrality. Norway was formally a member of NATO, but it did not allow the stationing of NATO troops on its territory, as northern Norway bordered upon Soviet territory and vital security interests. Together, these three North European countries spanned an East-West continuum between the Soviet and the NATO security realms..¹⁵⁶

Kurth also stated that the future geopolitical landscape could comprise politically independent and military neutral Ukraine, Belarus and Finland which could be inside the Russian security sphere. The Visegrad Four (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland), having close economic and cultural connections with the West and feeling attached to Western values, could be politically independent and keep their military neutrality like Sweden in the Cold War period. Being a member of NATO Germany could have no foreign troops in its Eastern territory, like Norway during the Cold War period.

In the hearings in the US Senate Fred Ikle emphasized:

I could say it is more comfortable for the Germans to have the buffer of Poland between them and Russia that has sort of an unpredictable future and is full of turmoil, than to be the closest ally of Poland with an alliance border then facing Belarus... In the harsh cold war era, we saw certain merit in having Sweden outside of NATO. Certainly, the Norwegians saw it that way. It probably helped keep Finland out of the Soviet grip as there was a

¹⁵⁵ *The Cold War and After*, Sean M. Lynne-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. (. London, 1994), p. 237.

¹⁵⁶ Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy," p. 16.

certain balance established by having Finland and Sweden outside, and Norway inside.¹⁵⁷

The driving force of this approach is an attempt not only to understand Russian national interests but to seek a possible compromise to take them into account. Though this approach may not be shared by so many scholars and politicians, but it testifies the diversity of the possible solutions.

The minimalists indicate that Russia, being interested in a favorable international environment, has legitimate interests in keeping this environment in Eastern Europe. In this relation NATO enlargement interferes in this zone and can be regarded as threat to Russia. Mandelbaum stressed this possibility:

That Russia would regard the new configuration of European security that an expended NATO would produce as illegitimate because it had been imposed over Russian opposition, even as Germany considered the post-World War I settlement an illegitimate "dictated" peace.¹⁵⁸

Another potentially dangerous development is that the procedure of the change of the present geopolitical landscape in Eastern and Central Europe is different from the previous procedure. As Mandelbaum noted:

It is significant that all the modifications in Europe's security from 1987 to the present, the net effect of which has been dramatically to reduce Russian power, have occurred with Russian consent. NATO expansion would mark a departure from that pattern.¹⁵⁹

The dramatic change of the above-mentioned pattern and the tendency to disregard Russia's opinion was noticed by Richard Pipes. He stated:

Certainly Russia should not be treated as a banana republic and subjected to military pressures without due consideration of its legitimate interests and wishes. To do so would only isolate Russia and provide ammunition to

¹⁵⁷ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 38.

¹⁵⁸ Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion." *Foreign Affairs* vol. 74. No. 3 (1995), p. 12.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

those extremist elements which insist that their country must once again build up a formidable military force because no matter what it does, it is doomed to be treated by the West as an enemy.¹⁶⁰

In general, Mandelbaum's theoretical approach on some issues related to geopolitical realities and spheres of influence is different from that of the maximalists. He considers that it is wrong to assess the present situation in Europe from the standpoint of classical balance-of-power theory. Arguing against proponents of NATO enlargement about the necessity to fill the security vacuum in Central Europe Mandelbaum responded:

In fact, there is no such vacuum. The foundation of a new and radically different security order is in place. It consists of the remarkable series of arms control accords, covering nuclear and conventional weapons... Together these agreements form an arrangement that Europe has never had, a common security order based not on the age-old balance of power but rather on consensus and cooperation.¹⁶¹

Such a notion as a sphere of influence vs security vacuum is a complicated issue to tackle. Looking at Mandelbaum's approach, it is noticeable that it differs not only from a maximalist one, but to some extent even from that of such minimalists as Kurth.

Minimalists also focus on the correlation between sphere of influence and a "zone of instability" in Eastern Europe. Some of them consider that NATO enlargement will lead to alterations in the established spheres of influence of Russia and the West. Such a possibility can ignite instability and provoke Russia. As Fred Ikle has stated:

Limited expansion would merely push the "zone of instability" further to the east while implicitly consigning those nations not tapped for membership to a Russian sphere of influence.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Richard Pipes, "Should NATO Expand?" *World View*, August 22, 1996.

¹⁶¹ Mandelbaum, p. 12.

¹⁶² Quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, "Expanding NATO: An Exchange Between Odom and His Critics." *The National Interest*. Summer 1995. p. 102.

R. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS

Minimalists attach big importance to the accommodation of the relations of NATO and Russia through institutionalization of their relations. The foundation of their approach comprises the following aspects:

First, they maintain that Russia should be involved in the system of European security as an equal partner. According to Holt:

The optimum outcome would be for Russia, the big loser in the cold war, to play in the East the role that Germany, the big loser in World War II, has played in the West. That may be impractical, but the thrust of US and European policy ought to be to involve Russia, not to isolate or contain or ostracize it.¹⁶³

Minimalists consider that Russia may regard NATO enlargement as a neocontainment strategy aimed at the isolation of Russia, its alienation from European security, and its encirclement by the West. In Ambassador Matlock's opinion:

Much of recent Russian recalcitrance can be traced to a feeling that their country is being left out of European security club. As a loner, Russia will always be a problem.¹⁶⁴

Second, it is more urgent to find ways to accommodate Russian interests with NATO's. As Ikle stated:

The most promising avenue still remains, in my view for the United States to see whether we can build a cooperative, mutually supportive relationship with Russia. As today, this goal still seems more important than tidying up loose ends in Eastern Europe.¹⁶⁵

In Ambassador Matlock's view:

¹⁶³ Holt.

¹⁶⁴ Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75. No. 3. p. 49.

¹⁶⁵ *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate.*, p. 23.

Washington must assure Moscow that it places a high priority on creating a European security structure to which Russia is a party. Whether that is done through a treaty relationship between Russia and NATO, an augmentation of the authority of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or some other mechanism is less important than the commitment to include Russia. NATO expansion to the east should be deferred while these arrangements are under active negotiations, provided Russia does not threaten other countries or seriously violates its OSCE obligations.¹⁶⁶

S. THE US OFFICIAL POSITION

This chapter will focus on the official US vision of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement. For this purpose the same dimensions will be used. Along with these dimensions the analysis will be aimed at determining if this position coincides with either one of the maximalists or minimalists or may be different from all of them.

T. ATTITUDE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

According to "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" NATO enlargement is aimed at dealing with instability or the possibility of conflicts in Eastern Europe. Speaking about NATO, President Clinton emphasized

NATO does not depend upon an ever-present enemy to maintain its unity or its usefulness. The alliance strengthens all of its members from within and defends them from threats without. There is no other cornerstone for an integrated, secure, and stable Europe for the future. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union want to be a part enlarging the circle of common purpose, and in so doing, increasing our own security.¹⁶⁷

U. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

According to the US official position its policy towards Russia is aimed at promoting democracy. The fate of Russia is closely connected with success or failure of its

¹⁶⁶ Matlock, "Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil," p. 49.

¹⁶⁷ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 7, no, 18, April 29, 1996, p. 814.

attempts at democracy. The US is interested in Russia being a democratic country and Russian values consistent with Western democratic values. In his remarks to students of Moscow State University, President Clinton highlighted as a condition of success of the reforms "Continuing to strengthen your democracy."¹⁶⁸ Great importance is attached to the destiny of democracy in Russia because its failure calls peace into question. Secretary of State Christopher stressed:

NATO is fulfilling its enduring mission by meeting new challenges. It is helping us overcome what are now the most immediate threats to the stability of Europe: the fragility of democratic institutions in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union.¹⁶⁹

According to "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:"

Russia is a key state in this [regard]. If we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia... we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partnership.¹⁷⁰

NATO enlargement is regarded as one of the ways to move democratic countries closer to Russia, ensuring the development of democracy there. This view is based on the idea of "democratic peace" and is liberal internationalism.

Testifying that while geopolitical and cultural determinism is a widespread phenomenon, Deputy Secretary Talbot denounced it:

There are plenty of voices... They are saying that it [war in Chechnya] proves Russia is country doomed--for reasons of geography, political culture, and history--to an authoritarian, if not totalitarian domestic order, and to aggressive, imperialistic international behavior. Our view is different. We don't believe in historical or geographical determinism. History and geography are hugely important factors, of course, in any state's identity and destiny. But we should be beware of stereotypes about national character, particularly ones that would--if they become the basis of policy--consign

¹⁶⁸ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 20, May 15, 1995, p. 400.

¹⁶⁹ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 50, 51, 52, (December 1995), p. 902.

¹⁷⁰ "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," p. 32.

whole peoples to dictatorship on the perverse theory that that is the kind of government they deserve, or the political system encoded in their genes.¹⁷¹

The official position taking into account geopolitical factor does not regard its impact as inevitable and unconditional.

Giving an assessment of the position of the proponents of geopolitical determinism--namely, firm maximalists--the Director of the Policy Planning Staff James Steinberg noted:

Some recommend that we base our relations with Russia and China on classical balance of power considerations. They would take it as a given that Russia is doomed to authoritarianism at home and expansionism abroad... We reject such notions of geopolitical and cultural predetermination.¹⁷²

Nevertheless, there is a ground to consider that this position is not that simple and contains a geopolitical approach. The same Steinberg stated:

By virtue of their size, geography, and potential economic, political, and military power, they [Russia and China] can still have a profound effect on the security and well-being of all our citizens--for good and for ill.¹⁷³

Besides geopolitical determinant, historical determinant can also be traced in this position. For example, Steinberg remarked:

Without question, history and geography will tug Russia's leaders in predictable--and sometimes dangerous--directions.¹⁷⁴

At the discussion in the US Congress on the future of NATO, Senator Lieberman remarked upon some historic factors determining Russian politics:

One is the historic inclination towards empire of Russia--a territorial outreach. And the second is the historic strength of Russia and Germany, the tension between them, and the way in which people in between have been caught and suffered as a result of that great power of Russian-German tension. In other words, why not act now to make sure that those historic

¹⁷¹ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 10, March 6, 1995, p. 177.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 393.

¹⁷³ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 19, May 8, 1995, p. 392.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 392.

tendencies, particularly the Russian inclination to empire, is checked now and does not have an opportunity to appear later?¹⁷⁵

Asked to comment on this statement Richard Holbrooke replied:

I agree completely with your description of Russian-German history and the vacuum of the lands in between. That is where the wars started.¹⁷⁶

It is significant that Holbrooke described only geopolitical and historic factors affecting Russian foreign policy and to some extent Germany's. It is not clear why Germany, being NATO member, democratic and consequently less militant and war-prone, should be spoken of in the same terms as marginally democratic Russia. This approach does not fit the US official position. At the TV press-conference Holbrooke maintained that in the post-Cold War period European politics returned to traditional pre-Soviet international politics. In this perspective foreign policy will be based not on ideological factor but on national interests. Thus, it is possible to assume that the phenomenon of geopolitics is likely to reemerge and to influence foreign policies. It is possible to assume that both Holbrooke's statement and Steinberg's contradictory statements bring to light the fact that geopolitical and historical determinism, despite official statements of the US leaders to the contrary, is present and can have an impact on the US policy-making in relation to Russia.

Steinberg also raised another important, in his opinion, dependence:

As we deal with China's and Russia's foreign policies, we are not indifferent to internal political developments. This is not simply because we are troubled by repressive practices on human rights alone--although we are deeply concerned by them--but also because we believe there are important linkages between what happens internally and how nations behave externally.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces Committee on Armed Services United States Senate* (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1996), p. 32.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁷⁷ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 19, May 8, 1995, p. 394.

This is an example of another perceived determinism in Russian foreign policy. These determinants make an argument for NATO enlargement from the realpolitik prospective. To a great extent such an assessment is in accordance with the geopolitical assessment of firm maximalists, who, like Kissinger and Brzezinski consider that Russia is doomed to be an imperialistic country despite the fact that the ideological factor has disappeared from Russian politics.

However, in spite of certain contradictions in the theoretical foundation of the US official position, all agree that Russia's future is impossible to forecast precisely. For example, Steinberg remarked:

As we approach the 21st century, Russia and China are both embarking on treacherous and, often, unpredictable paths of transformation in domestic as well as foreign policy.¹⁷⁸

Talbot admitted the significance of the force of inertia determining Russian politics:

We do not--we cannot--know for sure what kind of state Russia will be in the 21st century.¹⁷⁹

Examining the theoretical foundation of the US official position, it is possible to come to the conclusion that it is contradictory, both in terms of official statements in general and of pursued policy of NATO enlargement in particular. The US objective to enlarge NATO is based on the idea of "democratic peace," but at the same time the policy of realpolitik is evident when it is declared that one of the aims of enlargement is to fill the security vacuum in Central Europe and to tackle the problem of instability in the region. On the one hand, this is realpolitik because NATO enlargement will occur despite democratic development in Russia. On the other hand, this is liberal internationalism because NATO enlargement is connected with the pace and the direction of the democratic development in Russia. But in any way, there is a reason to call into question the US public official

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 392.

¹⁷⁹ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 10, March 6, 1995, p. 177.

statements that NATO enlargement is not aimed at any particular country including Russia.

Michael Dobbs noted:

Until now, the principal American rationale for NATO expansion has been the desire to consolidate free market democracy in eastern and central Europe. In private, however, U.S. officials say that plans for NATO expansion could be accelerated if Russia turns aggressive.¹⁸⁰

Thus, in terms of theoretical foundation the US official position can be described as a combination of geopolitics, which is a part of realpolitik, and liberal internationalism. That is why it is logical to assume that official visions of Russian national interests may be also contradictory.

The official US position boils down to the following strategy which can be called "Mixed Power Projection and Forward Presence with Elements of Neocontainment." The strategy implies:

- Russian medium/low threat.
- Collective defense model with limited joint posture.
- Emphasis on reinforcement, defensive infrastructure on the territory of the Eastern European countries.¹⁸¹

According to the official US position the path of NATO enlargement may be the following:¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Michael Dobbs, "White House Preparing For Possible Yeltsin Loss; U.S. Response to Israeli Vote May Serve as Model," *The Washington Post*, June 2, 1996.

¹⁸¹ This information is adapted from Ronald Asmus. *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, p. 56-57.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 55-57.

Path	Rationale	Assumptions	Timetable	Criteria	Who Decides
Combination of project stability and Strategic response	Part of overall Western integration, provide political/ security anchor	No major security problem, security vacuum, enlargement is necessary as "hedging against the possibility of resurgent Russian aggression" ¹⁸³	Moderate fast track	Political, strategic	NATO, Eastern-Central Europe

Table 4. US Path to NATO Enlargement

V. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT

Examining Russian national interests in terms of threat it is necessary to note that according to Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke the United States "recognizes Russia's special position and stature."¹⁸⁴ Such an estimation distinguishes the country from others and does not coincide with the position of Brzezinski, who tends to downgrade the role of Russia and the significance of its interests. Secretary of State Christopher also stressed that the "New Atlantic Community" could arise only "if we recognize Russia's vital role in it."¹⁸⁵

As a necessary condition of Russian national interests being a threat to no one, including the United States President Clinton emphasized the dependence of success of the reforms in Russia on the following:

¹⁸³ Strobe Talbot, "Why NATO Should Grow?" *The New York Review*, August 10, 1995, p. 29.

¹⁸⁴ Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2 (1995), p. 50.

¹⁸⁵ Paul Goble, "Eastern Europe: Analysis From Washington:--A Timetable For A New NATO," *Radio FRE/RL*, September 9, 1996, p.1.

Establishing your role in the world in away that enhances your economic and national security interest-not at the expense of your friends and neighbors, but in cooperation with them.¹⁸⁶

Such an attitude falls in line with that of the flexible maximalists.

In general, assessing Russian national interest, US officials held that they were not clear-cut enough. Steinberg maintained:

They [Russia and China] both are struggling to define appropriate foreign, economic, and security policies... while protecting their as yet ill-defined national interests.¹⁸⁷

This fact makes it difficult to pursue mutually acceptable policy, especially, when high-level Russian officials take different position on NATO enlargement. The former Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Lebed has stated that NATO enlargement did not pose any serious threat, at least, in the foreseeable future, while Defense Minister General Rodionov has talked of the threat to Russia of NATO enlargement.

Despite the fact that Russian and American interests may not be compatible on all issues, the American side does not regard it as an impasse in the relations. As Secretary of State Christopher noted:

We work with Russia whenever our interests coincide, and that has certainly produced very positive results as you heard me say before: a reduced nuclear threat... At the same time, it is only realistic and pragmatic to recognize that there are areas where we do not agree, where our interests seem to differ, and we try to be very candid with the Russians and to manage these differences so as to protect our interests.¹⁸⁸

NATO enlargement falls into such a category, where Russian and American interests are not identical. But so far American leaders view it is an issue for discussion but not confrontation.

¹⁸⁶ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 20, May 15, 1995, p. 400.

¹⁸⁷ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 19, May 8, 1995, p. 392.

¹⁸⁸ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 14, April 3, 1995, p. 257.

Indicating the variety of threats to Russian national interests, Steinberg stated:

In addition to a series of real and imagined threats from the south, Russia must also contend with the prospect of being isolated...¹⁸⁹

At this point Steinberg referred to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Duma (the lower house of the Russian Parliament) Vladimir Lukin, who said that Russia would find itself between "two Europes." One will be Europe of the European Union, including Central Europe and East-Central Europe as a result of NATO enlargement, and another "Europe" of the democratic and fast-developing countries to the east of Russia, meaning Asian democracies. Although Steinberg abstains from giving personal assessment to the validity of the threat the fact that he quoted Lukin indicates that he believes such a probability cannot be excluded.

The official US position acknowledges that Russian national interests by themselves cannot be a threat. However, it is necessary to examine the national interest as a tool or a political action. It would be reasonable to focus on how or by what means the goals in foreign policy are achieved. In this connection the US official view is that if "pragmatic policy of engagement" succeeds it that, as Steinberg maintained, "can help bring Russia to pursue its interests in ways consistent with international norms."¹⁹⁰ Thus, there is yet another requirement which Russia should meet in order to avoid the perception of her interests as threatening. Today, however, the character of Russian foreign policy aimed at achieving national interests can pose a threat to the West under certain conditions. In particular, Steinberg drew attention to the fact that:

...the increasingly assertive tone of Russia's leaders on a whole range of foreign policy issues stands in sharp contrast to the intense weakness of today's Russian state.¹⁹¹

The Russian attitude to NATO enlargement is an example of such a tough policy.

¹⁸⁹ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 19, May 8, 1995, p. 393.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 393.

¹⁹¹ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 19, May 8, 1995, p. 393.

W. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

According to "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:"

It [NATO enlargement] will help assure that no part of Europe will revert to a zone of a great power competition or a sphere of influence.¹⁹²

The US officials have been reticent about such the notion of a sphere of Russian interests in terms of the territorial dimension. They prefer to speak, as Secretary of State Christopher did, about:

...a number of critical security issues where Russia has special interests or capabilities. These include nuclear non-proliferation, implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, building confidence in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as nuclear safety and the prevention of nuclear smuggling.¹⁹³

Only at lower bureaucratic level American officials hint about such a thing as an area or a sphere of Russian national interests. For example, Steinberg maintained:

We do not underestimate the risks and challenges Russia faces during the transition period. Many of Moscow's most critical foreign policy dilemmas lie in sensitive areas close to home.¹⁹⁴

In this line Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense Frank Wisner gave a clear indication where the zone of Russian national interests could be located:

It would be very far from the Russian definition of what would be in that country's real interest. They have a different sphere of influence they are thinking of. They have developed their own alliance system. The CIS is the framework that they have been talking about.¹⁹⁵

Looking at this position it is possible to conclude that regardless of whether thinking in terms of zones or spheres is good or bad it is present. The evidence of this is the

¹⁹² A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House. 1996. p. 38.

¹⁹³ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 23, June 5, 1995, p. 473.

¹⁹⁴ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 19, May 8, 1995, p. 393.

consideration that there is security vacuum in Central Europe while Eastern Europe is the zone of instability. The fact that high-level US officials prefer not to articulate their assessments of Russian foreign policy in terms of the sphere of Russian national interests indicates their desire to avoid any possibility of being accused of line-drawing. As President Clinton emphasized:

NATO expansion should not be seen as replacing one division of Europe with another one. It should, it can, and I am determined that it will increase security for all European states--members and non-members alike.¹⁹⁶

X. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS

US officials are fully aware of the reality that Russian national interests and those of NATO on NATO enlargement may not coincide for some time. In the official US view it is not a tragedy because NATO enlargement is not aimed at line-drawing. The US seeks bridge the gap between the Russian and American positions, while keeping NATO enlargement going. The task is to accommodate Russian and American interests. As President Clinton emphasized:

In parallel with expansion, NATO must develop close, strong ties with Russia. The alliance's relationship with Russia should become more direct, more open, more ambitious, and more frank.¹⁹⁷

According to this position, Russian and American national interests should be accommodated not only through establishing a Russian-NATO relationship. As Secretary of State Christopher stressed:

We outlined a comprehensive vision of European security that includes an expanded NATO, a strengthened OSCE, and the development of new and

¹⁹⁵ *Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, p. 51.

¹⁹⁶ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 3, January 16, 1995, p. 29.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

cooperative relationships between Russia and NATO as well as with other international institutions.¹⁹⁸

This balance of interests, arranged through the institutionalization of the relationship, can play the role of a tool to accommodate them and to work out common approaches to common problems. This is especially important now because of the contradictory Russian and American assessments of NATO enlargement. Secretary Christopher noted that the US-Russian relationship:

...allows us to deal with our differences--even sharp ones--and to manage them without threatening to blow up the world. We have a very complex, multi-faceted, and broad relationship, and it is important that it not be held hostage to any single issue or reduced to a single issue.¹⁹⁹

In more concrete terms, Russian-American accommodation of interests can take place through established and signed programs like Partnership for Peace and membership-for example, Russia's membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)--as well as with new ones designed especially for Russia and NATO. In particular, Secretary Christopher underlined the openness of the America's position on broad cooperation with Russia, saying:

Russia can take an important step by providing a positive response to NATO's proposal for a political framework that includes permanent consultative arrangements.²⁰⁰

Steinberg spoke about a "Closer relationship between Russia and NATO, both through the Partnership for Peace and through enhanced NATO-Russia links."²⁰¹ Secretary Christopher offered as an option a special charter with Russia before the enlargement occurs. In his opinion, "the charter would provide a permanent mechanism for crisis management, making

¹⁹⁸ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 4, January 23, 1995, p. 49.

¹⁹⁹ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 14, April 3, 1995, p. 257.

²⁰⁰ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 7, no. 24, June 10, 1996, p. 299.

²⁰¹ "U.S. Department of State Dispatch," vol. 6, no. 19, May 8, 1995, p. 394.

it possible for NATO and Russia to respond immediately to eventual challenges.”²⁰² Also according to Christopher:

NATO and Russia need a charter because we share an interest in preventing armed conflict. That is why we seek a fundamentally new relationship between Russia and the new NATO.²⁰³

These views expressed by top and high-ranking US officials indicate that accommodation of the Russian and American national interests through institutionalization of the relations is as indispensable as NATO enlargement itself. It is also an indication that the US side is not only aware of the fact that Russia perceives NATO enlargement as a potential threat to its interests. It is also seeking an opportunity to achieve two ends simultaneously. On the one hand, a powerful military alliance moves closer to Russian borders leaving Russia out of its zone of security, on the other hand, it is aimed at not “losing” Russia, and at accommodating Russian interests through cooperation arrangements. As it is intended, such a US approach makes it possible to make Russian-American relations more transparent and easy to affect both in time of crisis and tranquillity.

²⁰² Sonia Winter, “Russia: Christopher Proposes NATO Charter For Russia,” *Radio RFE/RF*, September 9, 1996. p. 1.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

IV. SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY

The sociological survey was conducted at the Department of National Security Affairs of the Naval Postgraduate School in September 1996. The purpose of the survey is to gauge/analyze American attitudes toward Russian national interests vis-à-vis NATO enlargement. The number of respondents was seventy-six. They were students-military officers of different services. The participants in the survey were anonymous.

In the survey the following definitions were used:

- **Survival National Interests:** are interests which, if challenged, place "the very existence of the nation" in peril. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis, when there was a possibility of a short-notice, large-scale nuclear strike.
- **Vital National Interests:** are interests which, if challenged, will result in a "high probability of serious harm" to the security of the nation unless strong measures (including military ones) are taken by the government within a short period of time. For example, an attack on international oil resources.
- **Major National Interests:** are interests which, if challenged, could result in the "potential for harm" if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad. For example, drug trafficking in Latin America.
- **Peripheral National Interests:** are interests which, if challenged would result in "little if any harm" to the entire nation if a "wait and see policy" is adopted by the government. For example, the change of the government in Turkey.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ This information was adapted from Neuchterlein p. 9-13.

1. NATO enlargement should not occur because it threatens Russian national interests?






Figure 6. Question 1

2. How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian military security?



Total Respondents 76

Figure 7. Question 2

3. How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian economic-well being?






Figure 8. Question 3

4. How dangerous is NATO enlargement to the creation of an international environment that is favorable to Russia?



Total Respondents 76

Figure 9. Question 4

- 5. How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian international prestige?




Figure 10. Question 5

6. NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russia's ability to pursue its national interests within Russian borders?







Figure 11. Question 6



7. NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russia's ability to pursue its national interests within parts of the former Soviet Union (for example Ukraine, Belarus, etc.)?



Total Respondents 76

Figure 12. Question 7

8. NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russia's ability to pursue its national interests within the former Warsaw Pact countries (for example, Poland, Hungary, etc.)?



Total Respondents 76

Figure 13. Question 8

9. It is in Russia's national interests to become internationally belligerent against the US after NATO enlargement?







Figure 14. Question 9



9. It is in Russia's national interests to sign a NATO-Russia treaty on security cooperation?



Total Respondents 76

Figure 15. Question 10

11. Following NATO enlargement, it is in Russia's national interests to hold regular US-Russian consultations before the US meets for regular consultations with other NATO members?



Total Respondents 76

Figure 16. Question 11

12. It is in Russia's national interests to adopt a doctrine and deployment posture more directly posed against NATO following NATO enlargement?





Figure 17. Question 12

13. How much have you studied Russian and European issues?




Figure 18. Question 13

A. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS

1. Question One

NATO enlargement should not occur because it threatens Russian national interests?

Answering the first question the overwhelming majority of respondents 59 out of 76 consider that NATO enlargement should occur. Only 9 disagree and 8 do not have any opinion on the issue. This data indicates that there is strong support for NATO enlargement among American military. This position falls in line with the approach of both groups of maximalists and the US official position.

2. Question Two

How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian military security?

Assessing Russian military security in NATO enlargement, 37 respondents consider that the level of intensity of the challenged interest is major and 9 consider it vital and 30 peripheral. The fact that 37 and 9 respective respondents believe that NATO enlargement falls into the category of Russia's vital and major interests tends to indicate that a) the enlargement deals with Russia; and b) it can be defined as the policy of neocontainment. This roughly equal distribution of responses means that all positions are represented. This fact confirms the controversy and complexity of the issue of NATO enlargement.

3. Question Three

How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian economic-well being?

NATO enlargement challenges Russian economic well-being at the level of peripheral interest for 39 respondents. It is survival for 2 respondents, vital for 7, and major for 27. This trend reveals that Russian economic well-being is not going to be seriously affected though it is necessary to admit that in general the tendency can hardly be called insignificant, bearing in mind that 36 respondents do not perceive NATO enlargement as a

Russian peripheral interest. The division line here is typical for minimalists and other groups.

4. Question Four

How dangerous is NATO enlargement to the creation of an international environment that is favorable to Russia?

Answering this question 34 respondents think that NATO enlargement challenges Russia's peripheral national interest. Meanwhile, 17 consider it as vital and 25 as major. The total number, 42, of these respondents indicates that the international environment for Russia in terms of favorability tends to be unstable as a result of NATO enlargement. The distribution of responses testifies to the proximity to the minimalists.

5. Question Five

How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian international prestige?

Russian international prestige is challenged at the peripheral level of interest for 27 respondents while for 2, 19 and 28 it is, respectively, at survival, vital, and major levels. This fact means that Russian international prestige may suffer as a result of NATO enlargement. The majority of the responses is closer to the position of the minimalists.

6. Question Six

NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russian ability to pursue its national interests within Russian borders?

The overwhelming majority of respondents, 73, do not agree that NATO enlargement is aimed at interfering Russian domestic policies. This position falls in line with the position of both maximalist groups and with the US official one.

7. Question Seven

NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russian ability to pursue its national interests within parts of the former Soviet Union (for example Ukraine, Belarus, etc.)?

Commenting on this statement the majority of respondents, 45, disagrees with it. It means that there is a tendency to regard the parts of the former Soviet Union as the sphere of Russian national interests. Though on the other hand, the number of those who agree, 26, indicates that there is a fairly strong opposition to it. It may lead to the conclusion that under some circumstances NATO enlargement may affect Russia's national interests in the parts of the former Soviet Union. Although so far this trend does not have a clear-cut shape. On the whole, this position is approximate to the one of minimalists and, to some extent, the US official one.

8. Question Eight

NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russian ability to pursue its national interests within the former Warsaw Pact countries (for example, Poland, Hungary, etc.)?

Commenting on this statement the majority of respondents, 45, express their consent. It indicates that at the present stage NATO enlargement tends to reduce the area of Russia's national interests in the former socialist countries. Though, there is quite a big opposition of 30 respondents to it. This distribution means that there is a tendency in the students' opinions toward to the position of firm maximalists and the US official one.

9. Question Nine

It is in Russia's national interests to become internationally belligerent against the US after NATO enlargement?

The overwhelming majority of the respondents, 72, disagrees with the statement. This attitude testifies to the fact that being belligerent will do Russia no good.

10. Question Ten

It is in Russia's national interests to sign a NATO-Russia treaty on security cooperation?

Sixty-five respondents uphold the idea that a NATO-Russian treaty on security cooperation is in Russia's national interests. It testifies that the possibility of such a treaty

can smooth the tension and bridge the gap between NATO and Russia. This position coincides with all the approaches.

11. Question Eleven

Following NATO enlargement, it is in Russia's national interests to hold regular US-Russian consultations before the US meets for regular consultations with other NATO members?

The idea of the United States having consultations with Russia before the US meets for regular consultations with other NATO members was not approved by 18 respondents. Meanwhile, 34 respondents support it. Nevertheless, taking into account that 24 have no opinion, there may be no strong support for it.

12. Question Twelve

It is in Russia's national interests to adopt a doctrine and deployment posture more directly posed against NATO following NATO enlargement?

Commenting on this statement, 67 disagree with it. This fact leads us to the conclusion that it is in Russia's interest to resort to the policy "wait and see."

B. RESPONDENTS' COMMENTARY

In the survey the respondents were asked to comment on statements 9-12. Here are the most thought provoking commentaries, which testify to the variety of possible attitudes and views.

1. Statement Nine

It is in Russia's national interests to become internationally belligerent against the US after NATO enlargement?

Perceived threats against US could result in weakened relations and greatly increased US support for NATO, possibly to the point of further enlarging/increasing NATO powers.

International belligerency towards the West would be counter to Russia's long-term national interests. It would only serve to isolate Russia from Europe.

NATO enlargement brings stability + better economic conditions to Eastern Europe. A non-belligerent Russia will be able to benefit from this through trade.

Russia needs to stop worrying about everyone, this is a great opportunity to get her act together and take a position (strong) as a world leader.

They cannot afford to. Russia needs help from the US and NATO countries economically.

A lot of work has to be done in the former Soviet Union, we must all work together not in a vacuum.

The US is not the only member of NATO. It would probably cause more problems between Russia and the Republics and Nations trying to join NATO.

I believe Russia's time, effort and money would be better spent creating an economic environment (internally to Russia) that will blur the lines of its borders with its FSU [Former Soviet Union] States.

2. Statement Ten

It is in Russia's national interests to sign a NATO-Russia treaty on security cooperation?

This seems to imply hostility between Russia and NATO. The relationship should be one of cooperation, not adversarial. To say a treaty is of national interest seems to imply they would be in danger otherwise.

I think that a healthy dialogue between Russia and NATO is in everyone's best interests.

Security treaties add to stabilization and eliminate perceived threats between signers.

This would permit Russia to influence NATO affairs from within, not try to force them from without.

"Engagement" could be economically and politically in Russia's interest. NATO has not, in its 50 + years history of existence, been an impingement on the rights/sovereignty/national interests of its member-nations and the same should be the case in a mutual security agreement.

Russia participation with NATO will allow Russia to continue her role as a superpower and have an influence in Europe. In addition, through cooperation Russia could tilt NATO interests in ways that would be favorable to Russia.

3. Statement Eleven

Following NATO enlargement, it is in Russia's national interests to hold regular US-Russian consultations before the US meets for regular consultations with other NATO members?

US and Russia must communicate "before and after." Russia needs to be made part of process and made fully aware of what NATO is trying to do.

I'm not sure what this would gain other than perhaps strengthening Russian position if the US is used as an advocate for Russian interests.

The US should not meet with Russia over another country. Why should the US give Russia special attention other than what they warrant?

It would help Russia to have more influence over the new members of NATO.

This undermines the trust of other members of NATO which weakens the overall organization. Russia + US have no reason to discuss issues separate from other members unless the issue is of no concern of other members.

Meetings prior to NATO meeting could be very beneficial in terms of directing the meeting agenda as well as influencing the US/NATO decisions.

I agree that US + Russia should hold regular consultations, but not in the context that Russia will use the US as a sounding board.

The US is NATO.

It would depend on the issues being discussed. If they have a direct impact on Russia, I believe it would be in Russia's best interest to consult with the US. However, if the regular NATO consultations do not affect Russian interests than Russian-US discussions could be seen unfavorably as meddling where Russia does not belong.

US is the most powerful and influential NATO member. If Russia has concerns with potential NATO actions, voicing these concerns to the US

could avert actions contrary to Russian interests, and prevent NATO misunderstanding of Russian intentions or desires. (And vice versa).

4. Statement Twelve

It is in Russia's national interests to adopt a doctrine and deployment posture more directly posed against NATO following NATO enlargement?

Why? To revert back to the "good old days" of the Cold War. Russia has nothing to fear from NATO... Russia should participate more in PFP activities just to find out.

Be part of solution, not the problem.

I don't believe that NATO currently has hostile intent toward Russia, but if I were a Russian I would certainly want to monitor NATO very closely. Threat has two components: intention and capability. NATO may not have hostile intent, but has significant physical capability to cause harm to Russia.

Russia's main threat comes from the south (Iran, Turkey, and Muslim fundamentalism) and the east (Japan + China).

Looking at the results of the survey and the respondents' commentaries, it is necessary to note that to varying degrees, they comprise the elements of all approaches examined in the project. This means that the students' collective position does not fully fit into any of the three unofficial positions or the official one. Nevertheless, if we take the firm maximalists and minimalists as the two extremes, the respondents' opinions will be in between but closer to the position of minimalists.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis had the following basic purposes:

1. To focus on the notion of the national interest from the viewpoint of political science theory:
 - To analyze the notion of the national interest on the basis of two approaches of realist school: namely, the power position and the security one, and
 - To classify the national interest and to introduce a matrix;
2. To create and examine theoretical constructs of American unofficial views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement and then to test two hypotheses connected with the official US position;
3. To conduct a sociological survey to understand how American military officers view Russian national interests in NATO enlargement.

The theoretical consideration of the notion of the national interest revealed the fact that both the power and security approaches are not devoid of drawbacks, although it is necessary to admit that the security one is less detrimental. Nevertheless, their critical investigation and classification testifies to the fact that this kind of examination of the theoretical background and the non-dogmatic use of the classification make it possible to take a more rational look at the notion of the national interest in international politics.

Considering American views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement, it is necessary to underline some points:

- Because of the return to "traditional" foreign policy in the post-Cold War environment in Europe, the notion of the national interest is not obsolete and has a tendency to play a bigger role in a short-term perspective.
- The diversity of American unofficial views on Russian national interests in NATO enlargement testifies to the complexity of the issue and a range of possible positions. What unites all of them is the perceived necessity to seek the

accommodation of the interests of NATO and Russia through the institutionalization of their relations, though different rationales are used to make this case.

Tested hypotheses connected with the American official position led to the conclusion that Hypothesis #2, saying that: "The US official position does not fit either firm or flexible maximalists, or minimalists positions" is valid. The American official position comprises elements of all unofficial positions and is unique in its character. Looking at the official US position it is necessary to highlight the fact that it contains certain contradictions. On the one hand, it comprises elements of neocontainment vis-à-vis Russia. On the other hand, it is aimed at promoting friendly relations and partnership with Russia. The openly expressed opinions of the US leaders about the role of determinants in Russian foreign policy coincide with that of flexible maximalists, and are close to that of the minimalists. At the same time, paradoxically, their opinion runs counter to the opinion of James Steinberg, a senior official of the State Department, which coincides with the position of firm maximalists. On top of that, the official US position contains such features as a moderate fast-track NATO enlargement and some indications of consent for the zone of Russian interests in the CIS countries, both typical of flexible maximalists. On the whole, all these above-mentioned features prove that to a great extent, the official US position is controversial and not fully consistent with regard to Russia. It is possible to conclude that the mentality of the Cold War period is still alive. Thus, it may be likely that the US foreign policy will have its zig-zags toward Russia, especially if Russia stands by its opposition to NATO enlargement.

The idea of preserving the neutral zone between the former Soviet Union and NATO, Germany in particular, was based on the agreement of the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his Western counterparts not to enlarge NATO toward the East. The change of the official US attitude can be explained by American disbelief in the developments of a benign Russia and belief in the necessity to take advantage of the moment to enlarge the NATO zone of security. Regarding NATO enlargement as an imminent projection of stability into Central and Eastern Europe, the present US

administration considers the former Soviet republics unlikely to become NATO members in the foreseeable future. Thus, although the "zone of instability" narrows it remains and, indeed, is likely to increase Russian insecurity.

Anatol Lieven reports that the former US Ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering wrote in his cable to Washington: "If Kiev is more secure, then Warsaw automatically becomes more secure, but this is not true the other way round." The Ambassador stated that "enhanced security" for Eastern European countries did not necessarily mean the same for the former Soviet republics. Thus, enlargement may lead to the opposite results in terms of regional security.

On the whole, the consideration of official and unofficial American views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement makes a contribution to a better understanding of American attitudes toward Russia in general. Understanding these attitudes behind official policy helps to establish transparent and predictable relations between Russia and the United States in the post-Cold War period.

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